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CHAPTER 1
KENNEDY AND THE NEED FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Introduction
In January 1961, when John F. Kennedy raised his right hand and swore
to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, he had in his mind a very different conception of some of
those enemies than many of his contemporaries. Like many politicians of his
day, he believed strongly in the American doctrine of containment articulated by
George F. Kennan, a strategy designed to arrest the advance of communism
around the world by political, economic, diplomatic and, when required, military
means. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Kennedy did not believe that
America's reliance on its vast nuclear arsenal was equal to the task. He
believed, rather, that the foremost threat facing the Western world was
communist insurgency, not overwhelming conventional or nuclear force.
Therefore, he reasoned, America required a strategy that could meet a broad
range of challenges throughout the spectrum of conflict.
1
John F. Kennedy's belief in the need for a flexible response was the
product of several influences. The first was the Korean War. Kennedy believed
that America's inability to win a decisive victory in Korea, coupled with a
general
feeling among the American people that the war was an unnecessary
sacrifice,
had doomed Truman politically. He had been in Congress during the
McCarthy
1 Christopher M Lehman, "Protracted Insurgent Warfare: The Development
of an Appropriate
U S Doc me
"
in Guernlla Warfare and Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Sov.et
™cy>n *eT£d World,
Richard H. Schultz, etal. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath
and Company, 1989), 121-123.
1
era and had seen first-hand the perils for a politician who allowed himself to be
perceived as soft on communism. Part of Kennedy's belief, then, arose from
political pragmatism.
More important, however, were his experiences and those of his closest
advisors. In 1951, during his years in the Senate, Kennedy visited Vietnam. He
returned with a new conception of how best to execute a global containment
strategy. What he had witnessed in Southeast Asia was the failure of French
military strategy that relied on conventional weapons and tactics against a
dedicated communist insurgency. From that point forward, Kennedy's rhetoric
consistently stressed the need for a new level of capability, a strategy that would
allow for a flexible response to communist expansion without resorting to nuclear
war. "In practice", Kennedy argued in 1959, "our nuclear retaliatory power is not
enough. It cannot deter Communist aggression which is too limited to justify
atomic war. It cannot protect uncommitted nations against a Communist
takeover using local or guerrilla forces. It cannot be used in so-called brush-fire
wars... In short, it cannot prevent the Communists from nibbling away at the
fringe of the free world's territory or strength."
2 Kennedy was arguing for the
development of a counterinsurgency (hereafter abbreviated CI) capability to fight
communism in the Third World.
Kennedy would often find himself fighting an uphill battle in his quest to
create a viable CI capability. Most of his inner circle shared his views, as did
2 John Fitzgerald Kennedy, A Compilation of Statements and Speeches Made During
His
Service in the U S. Senate and House of Representatives, (Washington, D C: U.S.
Government
Printing Office, 1964): 288, quoted in Douglas S. Blaufarb, The
Counterinsurgency Era: U.S.
Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977),
53.
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several prominent officers in the U.S. Army. But, as a review of his early policies
by his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff points out, he had to develop this
capability in the face of fifteen years of momentum in the defense establishment,
momentum aimed at creating an "unchallengeable, absolute capability" in nuclear
weapons."3 He would have to change the mindset of much of his Defense
Department, as well as reorganizing and retraining its units for CI.
Kennedy's conviction that such a capability was imperative was bolstered
by events of the late 1950s that served to heighten an already acute public fear
that Communism was on the march. In 1956 the Soviet Union had supported a
victorious Nasser regime in Egypt against the combined power of Britain, France
and Israel. In 1957 the Soviets had beaten America into space by launching
Sputnik. In 1960 the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet
territory, capturing its pilot and embarrassing the United States.4 In the same
period, America had witnessed communist insurgencies in Laos, Vietnam, Cuba
and Malaya. While the outcome of the uprisings in Southeast Asia was still in
doubt and the insurgency in Malaya had been defeated, the sheer quantity of
communist guerrilla activity was cause for concern. The startling success of
guerrilla actions in Cuba added a sense of urgency and credibility to Kennedy's
calls to develop counterinsurgency capability as a weapon in the arsenal of
containment.
3 General L.L. Lemnitzer, "Summary of Military CI Accomplishments Since January, 1961", 21
July 62, NSF, M&M, Box 319, JFKL
4
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro
and
Kennedy, 1958-1964, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 77-78.
3
Taken together, the events of the 1950s fanned the flames of domestic
anticommunism and created a political climate that made dedication to the
strategy of containment an imperative for those seeking office. Such an
environment provided fertile ground for Kennedy's appeals for a new level of
capability, and he capitalized on the fact during his presidential campaign. His
attacks on the Eisenhower administration's focus on nuclear weapons, at the
expense of conventional forces, had been steady and severe throughout his
campaign. 5 Kennedy's claim that America needed new tactics to stem the tide of
global communism was well received by most Americans. He used the doctrine
of flexible response as an example of such a tactic. The ability to both describe
the problem and provide a solution carried great weight in the election of 1960.
The suspicions of the American public and the young President-elect
deepened when, on January 6, 1961, Nikita Khrushchev delivered his so called
sacred wars speech in which he intoned that "The Communists support just
wars. ..and they march in the van of the peoples fighting for liberation."
6 Kennedy
ordered his top foreign policy advisors to "Read, mark, learn and inwardly digest"
the Soviet Premier's words. It was clear that from the beginning that Kennedy
intended to make containment a priority, and on his terms. He answered
Khrushchev's rhetoric in his inaugural address with his famous promise that the
U.S. would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
5
Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University
Press, 1984), 526.
6 Fursenko and Naftali, 78.
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friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."7 With those
words, Kennedy ushered in not only a "New Frontier" for America, but also a new
phase of the Cold War, one that promised to be characterized by resistance to
communism on many new fronts.
From his earliest days in office, Kennedy demonstrated that he intended to
back up his rhetoric with action, and he immediately began making waves in the
defense establishment. Among his first directives to his national security staff
was to "examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of
counter-guerrilla forces."8
James Reston of The New York Times noted the stir caused by Kennedy's
innovations on March 1, 1961, writing "There was a big flap in Washington today
over reports that the Kennedy Administration was changing its military strategy."9
Reston apparently found the "flap" unnecessary, arguing that every new
administration reviews its military strategy. He went on, however, to colorfully
note Kennedy's emphasis on flexibility, saying that "Neither the President nor the
Secretary of State wants to use a sledge hammer to kill a fly,"
10
and he
paraphrased from Kennedy's early speeches regarding the need for a limited-
warfare capability. Reston described Kennedy's belief that America could not
7
Ibid.; Blaufarb, 53.
8 McGeorge Bundy, "National Security Action Memorandum Number 2", 3 February 61, NSF,
JFKL; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967): 413.
9 James Reston, "Another Big Controversy Over Very Little", The New York Times, 1
March
61.
10
Ibid.
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rely on its nuclear arsenal to prevent communist encroachment in the Third
World (Reston tellingly used Indochina as an example). The author then went on
to say that "accordingly, the President has already ordered more strenuous
training for anti-guerrilla warfare and no doubt more scientific brains will be
diverted to improving the capacity of the armed services to fight this kind of war
more effectively."
11
Despite the latter realization, Reston apparently failed to see
the full significance of Kennedy's new policy.
What Kennedy did in his early days was nothing less than add a new
dimension to U.S. military strategy. The implications of that new dimension
would become clear to all in the ensuing years, as America became deeply
entangled in brushfire wars in many corners of the globe. For John F. Kennedy,
the first of these entanglements came in Laos, where communist insurgents,
supported by North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, vied for supremacy
with neutralists and the Royal Government (supported by the United States).
What follows then is really three stories. The first is the development of
post-war counterinsurgency as a tool of containment and the lessons derived
from Truman and Eisenhower's forays into CI operations. The second is the
post-war history of political turmoil in Laos and American intervention efforts,
especially between 1955 and 1960. The third is a case study of the Kennedy
administration's counterinsurgency efforts in Laos and how they reflected
Kennedy's strategy of containment from 1961-1963.
I will attempt to explain the political, diplomatic and operational
considerations that drove Kennedy's decision making, with emphasis on the
11
ibid.
_
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following questions: What was the state of American CI doctrine when Kennedy
took over in 1961? How had that doctrine been developed? What did Kennedy
know about CI and how did his knowledge affect American doctrine? Did
Kennedy understand the situation in Laos? Did he know what kind of enemy he
was fighting? Given the answers to all of those questions, how did his theories
about CI play out in Laos, and how did Laos affect the development of CI
doctrine? In other words, did Kennedy's CI program in Laos meet his goal "killing
a fly" without "using a sledgehammer?" The answer to that question is important
to CI operations and foreign interventions in the post-Kennedy Cold War.
In Laos, as in much of Southeast Asia, Kennedy learned quickly that
domestic and international politics formed a house of cards, where action in one
place might have profound effects in another. The insurgency in Laos,
Kennedy's successors would find, was a small part of a larger regional
communist movement. Operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
military special operations forces in Laos, therefore, can be seen as something of
a primer for later interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Central America.
Both Kennedy and his successors drew a myriad of lessons from earlier CI
operations. Laos, for example, certainly influenced the political and military
leaders who executed American policy in Vietnam. Not all of the diplomatic,
political and military lessons learned were necessarily good ones. I will,
therefore, conclude with a brief discussion of how America's foray into Laos may
have set the nation up for failure in neighboring Vietnam.
7
The historiography of post-war counterinsurgency and American
operations in Laos has come in three discernible waves. The first of these
arrived in the late 1960s and 70s, and focused its attention on American
operations in Laos. The first group to emerge from the first wave of scholarship
on the subject is characterized by books like Bernard Fall's Anatomy of a Crisis
and Arthur Dommen's Conflict in Laos, sought to explain the Laotian political
background that brought about American intervention. A second group seems to
have been motivated by the ongoing war in neighboring Vietnam, as many
authors sought lessons from the earlier crisis to illuminate the current one.
Charles A. Stevenson's The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos
Since 1954 and Martin E. Goldstein's American Policy Toward Laos are good
examples of this. In his introduction, Stevenson promises to put Laos in its
proper perspective. His analysis of American policy is damning, arguing that it
"seems a series of mistakes," but he makes an effort to cast policy makers as
men with difficult decisions to make, often between several undesirable choices.
He also tells the reader that the mistakes of Laos may hold important lessons.
Goldstein, a political scientist, wishes to examine not what happened in Laos, but
why. Particularly he wants to uncover America's stake in Laos, and how all
parties to the conflict were able to reach the bargaining table in Geneva in
1962. 12
12
Arthur J Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization,
(New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1964); Bernard B. Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian
Crisis of 960-61
,
(Garden
City NY- Doubleday and Company, 1969); Charles A. Stevenson,
The End o[Nowhe e
:
American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954, (Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, 1972); Goldstein,
passim.
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These works are characteristic of the period in that they criticize policy
and, in Stevenson's case especially, point out its human cost among Laotians
and its financial costs to Americans, while stopping short of similarly criticizing
Kennedy. Such gentle treatment of Kennedy may be a product of his continuing
heroic status among many of the authors. Another explanation, and one that
forces a researcher to read his sources very carefully, is the fact that many of
these early examinations were written by members of Kennedy's own staff who,
following his assassination, were anxious to protect, or even build, the late
President's reputation. Roger Hilsman's The Politics and Foreign Policy in the
Administration of John F. Kennedy and Arthur M. Schlesinger's A Thousand
Days are good examples of this approach. 13 The authors of this first wave tend
not to directly address Kennedy's theories about CI, at least not with a critical
eye. Many of these authors, particularly those who served in the Kennedy
administration, end up sounding like apologists for any failures the President may
have suffered. With respect to the implementation of CI and foreign intervention,
for example, these authors tend to promote the notion that Kennedy had the right
idea about CI and how it could be used as a tool of containment. Any failures of
the President's CI doctrine are generally seen as the byproduct of resistance to
the change by a stubborn, conventionally minded defense bureaucracy.
Still another group of books that falls roughly into the first wave of
scholarship on Southeast Asia were the Vietnam province studies. Like Jeffrey
13 Roaer Hilsman To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in
the Administration of
John F Kennedy, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1967); Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Boston,
MA: Houghton-Mifflin
Company, 1965).
9
Race's War Comes to Long An, these books examine the effect of the war on
specific provinces and regions in Vietnam. 14 Their focus is usually in the
Johnson and Nixon years, but their background chapters frequently review
Kennedy's policies in Vietnam. As such, they frequently pass judgment on his CI
programs. Race, for example, argues that Kennedy and his successors simply
failed to grasp the power behind the communist movement in Southeast Asia.
America misunderstood the enemy, in his view, and therefore responded with the
wrong tactics. While books like Race's study the provinces in Vietnam, their
indictments of American policies to combat communist insurgency in Southeast
Asia are relevant to the struggle in Laos.
Following the end of America's involvement in the Vietnam War, another
wave of books arrived that attempted to illuminate the development of CI
doctrine, sometimes to demonstrate why or how it failed in the recent conflict, but
more often to draw lessons from past operations, sometimes using Laos and
Vietnam as examples. Douglas Blaufarb's The Counterinsurgency Era and Larry
Cable's Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine and
the Vietnam are the best examples. Blaufarb provides copious detail on the
background of both insurgency and counterinsurgency, analyzes the lessons of
operations in the Philippines and Malaya and looks hard at how well Americans
have translated CI lessons into doctrine and practice. Cable follows a similar
path, with more attention paid to lessons learned and unlearned from CI
operations in Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaya and, interestingly,
14
Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).
10
"the Banana Wars" in Central America. A growing subset of this genre examines
CI efforts in Vietnam specifically, usually focusing on the failure of the defense
establishment to properly balance conventional and unconventional approaches
to the insurgency. Andrew Krepinevich's The Army and Vietnam is an excellent
analysis that falls into this category. Krepinevich suggests that, despite painful
experiences in Southeast Asia and the Army's pledge of "no more Vietnam's",
the defense establishment has remained resistant to change and has, after all,
learned few of the lessons of its past. 15 While these historians focus on CI
doctrine, they tend to touch only briefly on Kennedy in the telling of a larger story.
When they do focus on Kennedy's decisions on CI, it is usually with an eye
toward how they affected Vietnam, rather than Laos.
The third wave of writing on Laos and CI came in the 1990s. As many of
the operatives who executed American CI programs in Southeast Asia retired,
they began to write books about their experiences. Most of these are
characterized by a limited view of operations. While many of the earlier works
tackle policy and doctrine, these later works examine execution on the ground,
and illustrate how high-level decisions affected low-level operations. Many of
these books are harshly critical of the Kennedy administration and, while they are
usually excellent books, some seem motivated by bitterness over the fate of the
indigenous personnel the authors had a hand in training. Perhaps the best pair
15
Blaufarb passim; Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War, (New York: New York University Press, 1986);
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981).
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to come out of this genre are Robert Conboy's amazingly detailed account
Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Roger Warner's Shooting at the
Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos. Again, one must read
this set of books carefully because, while they are great for providing perspective
as to how American intervention played out on the ground, they are sometimes
colored by personal dissatisfaction with the outcome of operations, as is the case
with James E. Parker's Codename Mule: Fighting the Secret War in Laos for the
CIA. This latest group of historians comes closest to the theme of this essay
by covering both the background to the crises in Laos and the actions on the
ground meant to deal with those crises. Their scope is very broad; most books of
this sort cover U.S. intervention from its beginnings in 1955 until its end in 1973.
Many go beyond that to tell what happened after the U.S. left Laos. Even these
detailed accounts, however, tend to offer only limited analysis of Kennedy's CI
theory and doctrine. The analyses they offer on the subject, moreover, are often
culled from the secondary sources of their predecessors, most notably Blaufarb.
In attacking my subject, I will draw from many of these sources as well as
numerous primary sources to arrive at some conclusions of my own about CI
lessons learned and unlearned and describe how CI doctrine was developed and
how it played out in Laos. In that respect, this essay is something of a synthesis
16 James Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos, (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press,
1 995); Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos,
(South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1996); James E. Parker, Codename Mule: Fighting the
Secret War in Laos for the CIA. Another, smaller body of literature that coincided with the final
wave reflected, somewhat, the trend towards social history in that its subject was not CI or
lessons learned from operations in Laos, but rather, the exploitation and abandonment of the
Hmong by American politicians and advisers. For a good example of this, see Jane Hamilton-
Merritt's Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-
1992, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993).
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of the three waves of scholarship as they relate to the Kennedy years, 1961-
1963. I will break new trail, I believe, by focusing on Kennedy's thinking about CI
and how it affected operations. Kennedy left few personal documents that tell us
what he thought or knew about many of the subjects that occupied his
presidency, including the crisis in Laos. There are documents, however, that can
tell us what Kennedy was being told by his advisors. From these documents we
can derive what Kennedy knew. We can then look at what he did to draw some
conclusions about what he thought. Using some newly declassified documents, I
will argue that Kennedy's thinking on CI had much to do with the outcome of
American intervention in Laos and, ultimately, Vietnam.
Post War Lessons
Counterinsurgency operations were not new when Laos and Kennedy
together arrived on center stage in 1961. They were not Kennedy's invention,
despite his reputation as their leading benefactor. Modern American
counterinsurgency operatives can trace their lineage to intelligence agents and
special operations forces that have engaged in covert, counter-guerrilla missions
from the French and Indian War through today. Their legacy includes the famous
exploits of Rogers' Rangers in colonial America, Francis Marion during the
American Revolution, Mosby's Raiders during the Civil War, and Merrill's
Marauders and the OSS during World War II.
17
17
Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, "Special Warriors of the U.S. Army,"
Airman: The
Official Journal of the Air Force 5 (November 1961), 42-44.
18 Mao Tse-tung, Six Essays on Military Affairs, (Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1972), 232-
253.
13
During the Cold War, insurgencies have generally been armed,
revolutionary struggles against a government or political ideology. They typically
developed as efforts by communist-trained insurgents in the third world to
redistribute land and wealth to the peasantry, and use the support this garnered
to combat a non-communist or pro-west government. Most communist-led
insurgencies followed the doctrine of protracted war articulated by Mao Tse-tung,
the main principle of which is to fight a long series of guerrilla engagements to
exhaust and demoralize the enemy. 18 The most striking example of a true,
comprehensive insurgency might be Ho Chi Minh's so-called people's war in
Vietnam. By appealing to the impoverished majority of Vietnamese peasants
with promises of land and economic reform, Ho was able to muster an amazingly
dedicated and resilient following that ultimately wore down a numerically and
technologically superior foe. In so doing, he demonstrated the difficulty of
fighting a true insurgency with conventional weapons and tactics. Because of the
social revolutionary nature of people's war, effective CI engages the political,
economic and social realms, as well as the military.
19
CI has as its object the
destruction of an entire insurgent movement, rather than a single enemy unit or
20
objective. Direct action, therefore, is merely part of the equation.
In the two decades following the Second World War, however, America
had no coherent CI doctrine. With the exception of the CIA, few agencies
19 Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, 1920-1969, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Press, 1973),
passim, but especially 94-95, 195-208; FM1 00-20, chp 2. 2.
20 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.:
USGPO,
1990), chp. 2.
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outside the Department of Defense played, or cared to play, much of a role in CI.
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower presided over CI operations in Greece, Italy
and the Philippines. The British, meanwhile, engaged in counterinsurgencies in
Malaya and Singapore. The success of these early post-war CI operations
promised a bright future for the containment of communism. For America, which
had no doctrine for CI, these early operations taught some early lessons about
the type of small wars the U.S. would encounter throughout the Cold War as it
sought to contain communism and the insurgencies it inspired. Some of those
lessons misled American leaders about the nature of insurgency and the real
costs of CI.
21
The Greek Civil War, from 1947-1949, provided the U.S. with its first post-
war CI testing ground. Based on the definition provided above, it was a CI
operation only insofar as it was an effort to support the Greek government
against a communist insurgent. American intervention was extremely limited and
involved primarily logistical support to conventional operations by Greek forces.
Little effort was made, at least on the part of the Americans, to win the support of
the people or answer any of the indictments of the insurgents with preemptive
social or political programs of their own. More importantly, the Greeks
themselves carried out most of the difficult work and all of the combat, under the
21
For concise discussions of the significance of post-war CI operations, see Theodore
Shackley The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations, (New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1965): 8-9, and John Prados, President's Secret Wars: CIA and
Pentagon
Covert Operations From World War II Through the Persian Gulf, (Chicago: Elephant
Paperbacks,
1996) 220 Two articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1954 provide
detailed
contemporary assessments of two of the operations examined. They have been
anthologized in
Thomas N Greene ed The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, (New York: Praeger Publishers,
15
inspirational leadership of a Greek hero, Field Marshal Alexander Papagos. U.S.
involvement was hardly decisive.
The Greek government defeated the communist insurgents, in large
measure, because the insurgents, "in search of a quick victory... conventionalized
their forces...and sought to defeat the regular Greek Army in head-on
war... ignoring the concept of protracted war."22 By doing so, the insurgents
squandered any advantage they may have held because of the psychological
value of guerrilla operations. By standing and fighting a conventional war, they
virtually guaranteed their own defeat. 23
The Greek operation, therefore, provided few valuable lessons as to the
intensity and difficulty of counterinsurgency operations. The lessons it did teach
may have done more harm than good. In a report to McGeorge Bundy in
November 1961, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council
George C. McGhee draws lessons from past CI operations for use in Vietnam.
Entitled "Counter-Guerrilla Campaigns in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines",
the report cites the leadership of U.S. General Van Fleet and the practice of
letting U.S. advisors go forward with combat units as decisive factors in the
victory. He scarcely mentions the Greeks at all, except to laud "the increased
efficiency of the GNA as a result of informed Greek leadership and of U.S. advice
1962). On Malaya, see Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S.N. Mans, "Victory In Malaya"; On Greece,
see Colonel J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War.
22
Blaufarb, 23.
23
Ibid. Mao articulated his theory of protracted struggle in 1938, so presumably
it was
available to the Greek insurgents.
16
and training."24 Flush with an easy victory, the Truman Administration did little to
bolster its ability to conduct CI operations and the lessons it saved for its
successors may have led them down the wrong path. The U.S. failed to develop
its CI doctrine and capability, even as communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia
appeared to be learning from their mistakes extending their resistance to the
French and what Ho called "U.S. imperialism".25
The Huk rebellion in the Philippines provided another challenge and
another easy victory for American CI. In 1946 the Huks, a native resistance
group that fought the Japanese throughout WWII, reacted violently when they
began to lose power to the new government following post-war elections.
Essentially, they felt betrayed by the new government whom they had helped
bring to power. Armed with a resistance network leftover from the Japanese
occupation, they seized control over the central Luzon region and ruled it as if it
were a separate state, running schools and providing other forms of
governmental services.
Early efforts by the Philippine government to counter the Huks were
entirely military and bore little fruit until they modified their tactics and strategy.
Through trial and error, the Philippinos "[discovered] the superior effectiveness of
light infantry units, the use of specialized scout squads to reach into and strike at
enemy base areas, [and] the reliance on armed civilians under military
24 George C. McGhee, "Counter-guerrilla Campaigns in Greece, Malaya
and the Philippines",
21 November 61, pOF, Subjects, CI, JFKL
25
Ho, 95-95.
17
supervision to defend their own homes."26 Military operations did not defeat the
Huks, however.
In 1950, with the insurrection in full bloom, Philippine President Quirino
named Ramon Magsaysay Secretary of National Defense. Magsaysay had
commanded 10,000 Philippino resistance fighters during the War and was
sharply critical of the government's efforts to defeat the Huks. He embarked on
an ambitious and decidedly unconventional approach, both within the military and
without.
Among his reforms, he demanded that the Philippine army treat civilians in
their areas of operations with respect, declaring that "every soldier had two
duties: first, to act as an ambassador of good will from the government to the
people; second to kill or capture the Huk."27 Magsaysay's insistence on his
military's sensitivity to civilians was, perhaps, the first demonstration of the
effectiveness of what would come to be known as "civil military operations".
Magsaysay's American advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, writes
in his memoirs that he encouraged the Philippine leader to expand on this theme,
suggesting the use of the military to assist civilians whenever and however they
could. By doing so he would eliminate many of the problems that the Huks
exploited to gain local support.
28 Magsaysay agreed, and embarked on a civic-
26
Blaufarb, 28.
27
Ibid., 30.
28 Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia,
(New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), 70.
18
works program that should have stood as an example for the nation building that
would characterize later efforts to combat people's war.
Most importantly, Magsaysay instituted a small but fundamental program
of land reform. Under the auspices of the Economic Development Corps,
Magsaysay instituted rent controls and provided the landless with a means to
redress legal complaints against their landlords through the military's Judge
Advocate General's Corps. He also promised land on the island of Mindanao to
any of the Huks who were willing to lay down their arms. Once settled, he
promised government assistance until these families got their farms up and
running. While only 250 Huk families accepted Magsaysay's offer, the program
succeeded in its effort to alleviate the chief complaint of the insurgents:
29
inequitable distribution of land and the economic hardship it created.
In the Philippines, as in Greece, American intervention was limited. The
U.S. provided advice and economic aid, both of which made a difference, but the
decisive action was taken by the Philippine government, Magsaysay in particular,
to earn and keep the support of its people. While the happy coincidence of
Lansdale's ideas and Magsaysay's leadership proved an effective combination,
the victory was primarily a Philippino effort. As D. Michael Shafer points out in
Deadly Paradigms, prior to Magsaysay's arrival on the scene, American policies
had little effect on the Huk insurgency.
30 The operation was, nevertheless,
perhaps the first successful CI operation of the Cold War. It encompassed a total
29 D Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S.
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effort on the part of the government to dismantle not just the forces of the
insurgent enemy, but also his base of popular support. It engaged in civic works
projects and land redistribution, using military resources to assist the populace,
and actively pursued positive civil-military relations. It should have provided a
bevy of lessons for the developers of American CI doctrine. But despite
Lansdale's input, the Philippine victory came almost as easily for the Americans
as had the earlier Greek one. Americans misinterpreted the reasons for the
victory, and therefore reinforced the wrong lessons.
The American military and intelligence communities came away with the
impression that CI was cheap and effective. It may have been the latter, but it
would often prove not to be the former. "The element of good luck finding a
Magsaysay", Douglas Blaufarb argues, "was not always understood as what it
was—sheer good luck."31 McGhee's 1961 report to Bundy affirms the notion that
the US was still not drawing appropriate lessons from its operations. McGhee
stresses the importance of the U.S. advisory role, then the leadership of
Magsaysay, followed by building civilian support for the government as important
factors leading to success.
32 The U.S. moved on, satisfied with its undeveloped,
but apparently successful, CI program and unwilling or unable to grasp the true
catalysts behind the success of operations in Greece and the Philippines.
In 1948, the British began to have insurgency problems of their own in
Malaya. As in Greece and the Philippines, the insurgents in the British colony
were motivated by communist ideology. Also like those operations, the British
31
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met with great success. The British experience in Malaya is important for two
reasons. First, it revealed the importance of a comprehensive, systematic
approach to insurgency. Second, it illustrated how important local conditions
were to a CI operation. As seems to have often been the case, U.S. officials took
the lessons they liked from the Malaya experience and discarded those they
disliked.
The situation the British faced in Malaya was unlike most that the United
States had, or would encounter in its battles against communist insurgency. The
first, and most important factor was the fact that the British were in charge in
Malaya. They ran the local government and the military, and therefore had no
need to route orders or policies through local authorities for approval. What local
authorities were involved worked for the British, rather than with the support of
the British, an important distinction. That sort of simplicity in command was
invaluable, especially when one considers the difficulty U.S. officials had working
with their counterparts in such places as Laos. Direct authority over many of the
elements involved in the British CI effort played a decisive role in their success.
Second, the backbone of the Malaysian Communist Party and its guerrilla
war against the British was the country's Chinese minority. This population
formed only about a third of the whole, and commanded little allegiance among
the general population. Furthermore, they were a readily identifiable minority,
concentrated along the island's west coast and separated from the rest of the
island by a chain of mountains. This geographic and social isolation allowed the
British to focus their efforts in one place and against one ethnic group. Third, the
32 McGhee, "Counter-guerrilla Campaigns in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines".
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British had controlled Malaya long enough that there was an extensive cadre of
British civilians on the island with detailed local knowledge. These people
provided critical intelligence and early warning.
Fourth, the British placed responsibility for suppressing the insurgency in
the hands of a war committee composed of both civil and military authorities.
This organization allowed for a rapid response to insurgent activity, while
maintaining sensitivity to the needs of the local population. The British have a
long-standing tradition of civil-military cooperation and it proved crucial to their
success in Malaya. The cooperation of civil and military authorities allowed the
British the luxury of separating insurgents from civilians, one of the basic
principles of CI operations. Finally, the Malaysian Communist Party, importantly,
received little external support in their efforts to overthrow the British.33 McGhee
seems to have garnered the right lessons from Malaya. He stresses the
centrality of the British political effort to the overall CI campaign and the good use
of intelligence to isolate the insurgents, thereby removing them from their base of
power, the populace. Despite these revelations, however, he still fails to
recognize the crucial importance of the insurgents' inherent weaknesses and the
coordination of civil and military operations in the British victory.
While the lessons of the British experience in Malaya seem clear in
retrospect, American observers apparently recognized some but not others. For
33
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example, the Army's initial doctrinal manual for Cl-style operations, FM 31-21
Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, published in 1958, reflected
the experience of the Army Special Forces in Korea, where they were created to
organize partisan resistance to the communists, rather than to operate as part of
a unified CI campaign. "Using [this] model," argues Richard Downie, "the Special
Forces concentrated on the mission of organizing friendly guerrilla forces behind
enemy lines and coordinating the efforts of these guerrillas with U.S.
conventional force operations."35 Based on the Army's published doctrine, the
lessons of civil-military cooperation had not been integrated as late as 1958 into
a service-wide CI doctrine, nor had the defense establishment seen fit to tailor a
force specifically organized and trained to execute CI operations. While the
McGhee report acknowledges the importance of "the inter-relationship of military
tactics and socio-economic reform" and that "there is no substitute for strong
leadership, integrated both politically and militarily", the evidence suggests that
American CI doctrine was slow to institutionalize these important lessons, while
misinterpreting the importance of some of his earlier ones.
36
With confidence born of easy victory in Greece and the Philippines, the
American military marched on through the 1950s and into the Kennedy years
without a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine. Throughout the post war years,
particularly under President Eisenhower, the country and its armed services
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remained caught up in the idea that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation was
enough to deter communist aggression. When forced into operations requiring
covert, or Cl-style capabilities, the CIA was often the weapon of choice, rather
than the military. CI doctrine continued to stress conventional forces and tactics,
and paid little heed to the lessons of successful civil-military operations. The key
pieces that seem to have been overlooked in most lessons taken regarding CI
were the importance of ideology and its link to the support of the local population.
In April, 1961, a London Times correspondent wrote a piece on Kennedy's shift
towards increased capability in limited war. "The CIA man in the Brooks Brothers
suit is being replaced by a soldier with a switch knife." he wrote, "The new hero
is... a soldier expected to join in, and win, the military-political battles... Notably
absent in. ..official appreciations of... contests] like Cuba, Laos and South
Vietnam, is any reference to the ideological nature of the contest. There would
appear to be a national inability to comprehend that sincere men can believe in
communism, or that a people will not necessarily rise up against a dictator such
as Dr. Castro, who has at least instituted some basic reforms."37 .
There certainly seems to have been a kind of blindness to ideology in
some of the lessons learned about CI. That blindness does seem to be, as the
preceding article implies, somewhat ethnocentric. Nevertheless, by April, when
the article appeared, Kennedy appeared to be a firm believer in the use of CI to
contain communism and was making aggressive moves to inculcate his
philosophy throughout his administration. Fortunately, there were several
37 London Times Correspondent, "James Bond Qualities for the U.S. Guerrilla Fighter", The
London Times, 27 April 61.
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important proponents of CI capability around the President, who was himself a
strong believer.
Counterinsurgency doctrine in 1959 and 1960 looked very similar to how it
had looked at the end of World War II. That is to say, there was very little
published doctrine and what there was had yet to show much positive influence
from post war lessons learned in the Philippines and Malaya. America still
viewed CI as a military mission that could be carried out by conventional military
forces. In special cases, like the communist insurgencies in Greece and the
Philippines, the doctrine said, conventional units could be reorganized into
smaller, lighter units to address a guerrilla enemy. In some cases the Special
Forces could be used to raise local resistance to conventional forces. American
soldiers and money remained at the center of its CI thinking. As yet, American
CI doctrine neglected non-military approaches and failed to recognize the
importance of addressing the roots of insurgency. No mention was made in the
1958 CI manual of fundamental economic or political reform as a key ingredient
in a unified CI effort. Proceeding from this baseline, Kennedy's rhetoric
promoting a doctrine of flexible response promised to revolutionize CI doctrine.
The fact that Kennedy took over with major insurgencies burning in Cuba, Laos
and Vietnam would test just how well Kennedy understood CI himself.
Kennedy's Increased Emphasis on Limited War
The documents of the early Kennedy administration make it clear that by
"limited war", Kennedy meant "insurgency" and almost always communist
25
insurgency at that. The documents also suggest that Kennedy received plenty of
advice as to what constituted insurgency and how best to fight it.
In February 1961, Robert H. Johnson, a member of the NSC's policy
planning staff, issued his first report on Key National Security Problems. As if to
reinforce the President's position, he highlighted the "grossly inadequate
conceptual basis for our various programs relating to the developing areas..."38
The implication is that holdovers from the Eisenhower administration in the
Pentagon still favored a strategy predicated on massive retaliation, rather than
flexible response.
At one of his first NSC meetings Kennedy served notice of his priorities
when he asked his staff, "what are we doing about guerrilla warfare?"39 He
followed up that meeting with National Security Action Memorandum #2, dated
February 3, 1961 . Its content was straightforward; he ordered the Department of
Defense and "other interested agencies" to "examine means for placing greater
emphasis on the development of counter-guerrilla forces."40 This memorandum
marked the beginning of an emphasis on CI that would endure for most of the
Kennedy administration.
To steer the administration in the right direction, Kennedy appointed a
Military Representative to the President, choosing for the job General Maxwell D.
Taylor, something of a legend in military circles. He had been one of the
38
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pioneers of airborne operations in the Army and had fought with the 82nd
Airborne Division and commanded the 101 st Airborne Division in World War II.
He had later commanded the 8th Army in Korea and been Chief of Staff of the
Army. He was the consummate paratrooper in an era when paratroopers were
considered cutting-edge, the vanguard of the new military. He had opposed
Eisenhower's strategy of reliance on a massive nuclear strike capability to the
point of resigning his commission to protest conventional force cuts. He was also
among the first to embrace the theory of "flexible response." Best of all, from the
perspective of many in Kennedy's inner circle, he combined all of his military
expertise with cultured intelligence. He was a published author, an academician
(he spoke Japanese, had taught Spanish and French at West Point, and later
became the Academy's superintendent) and director of the Lincoln Center for the
Performing Arts. General Taylor was emblematic of everything Kennedy wished
his military to be—smart, flexible and unquestionably competent.41
Kennedy's administration echoed his belief that a flexible response
capability was critical in its first National Intelligence Estimate, dated January 17,
1 961 . It stated, "It is now widely held that, in order to prevent such a paralyzing
choice [nuclear war for a limited cause] it is necessary to have limited war
capabilities, so that comparatively minor threats can be countered with
appropriate means. But in recent years limited war capabilities in the West have
been declining rather than rising... There has been a trend toward the reduction
41
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of budgetary allocations for the modernization and mobility of limited-war-capable
forces."42
The revelation that Western defense budgets had neglected limited
warfare was followed by an admission that there was much about limited war that
remained to be developed. What, for example, constituted grounds for
intervention? How did one prevent a limited war from becoming a general war?
And, tellingly for the climate of the times, how could the U.S. prevent the Soviets
from introducing nuclear weapons into a limited war theater? Kennedy and his
Departments of State and Defense set to work on those questions immediately,
but they had been left precious little information from the Eisenhower
administration, and much of it reflected older thinking and the former President's
lack of emphasis on CI. On January 24, 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara sent Kennedy a memo with his recollections of the last meeting
between Eisenhower and the President-elect. On the subject of limited war,
McNamara recalled, one of Eisenhower's advisors (Secretary Gates) had argued
that "The United States [could] handle any number of limited war situations at
one time."
43
Clearly, if the defense establishment believed that, Kennedy had his
work cut out for him. Gates' thinking reflected the doctrine of the time, implying
as the manuals did that conventional forces could carry out limited war missions.
In so arguing, both Gates and the contemporary doctrine failed to see limited war
as Kennedy did, heavily influenced by political considerations.
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Kennedy's emphasis did not mean instantaneous transformation,
however. On February 14, 1961, National Security Staff member Robert W.
Komer sent a memorandum to W.W. Rostow complaining that, despite the top
"limwar" threats coming from Laos, Vietnam, Congo and Lebanon, "most
Pentagon planning and certainly most of our military aid programs are still based
on the concept of meeting major overt local aggression on a multi-division
scale....DOD people tend to concentrate on anti-guerrilla problems, rather than
on preventive medicine..."44 More evidence followed in April when James Cross
of the Institute for Defense Analysis published a study that found the Army
continued to stress military action and organization in CI operations, rather than
its non-military aspects. Cross tells the study's recipient, W.W. Rostow, that
Philippino President Magsaysay had explained to him "his paradoxical double
problem of getting the Philippino army into shape to fight effectively and then in
restricting its full use in combat to permit his achieving a politically stable victory."
He goes on to bluntly warn Rostow that the lesson of past CI operations is that
"an ex-insurgent, disillusioned, reformed, and rehabilitated can be a valuable
citizen, while a dead insurgent usually leaves behind him some friend and
relatives and a long, lingering bitterness... few things are more politically
dangerous for a government that depends in any way on the consent of the
governed than to suppress irregulars and rebels by military action alone
..45
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Cross's findings, and his warnings to Rostow, came at a time of policy review for
the Kennedy administration, and told them what they believed to be true already,
that there needed to be a significant shift in both thought and action.
In May 1961
,
Robert F. Kennedy sent his brother a copy of a 1960 Army
report entitled "Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression
of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations". It is a detailed analysis of
communist command and control of insurgent operations in the third world and
how to fight them. It argued that, "the basic causes of revolutionary warfare are
seated in the politico-psychological and socio-economic instability of the
country... the guerrilla/terrorist movement is the result, not the cause of the
problem... the anti-guerrilla/terrorist operations must aim at severing the enemy
from their base within the people, and must, therefore, emphasize political,
psychological and economic actions... the guerrilla must be opposed by his own
actions... a military operation alone has never been shown to extinguish guerrilla
operations of a significant nature."46 The report runs for over 80 pages and, in
addition to the assertions above, provides a thorough description of communist
theory and an assessment of the COMINTERN'S role in fomenting and directing
insurgencies around the world. Its most important chapters, however, appear as
appendices that provide examples of tactics to be used against insurgent forces.
One of these appendices includes the development of a village-based
protection system and resistance movement that strikingly resembles the
strategic hamlet program later attempted in Vietnam. It stresses the importance
46
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of the physical separation of the local population from the insurgents to prevent
the subversion of the former and to remove the base of support from the latter. It
also calls for the government, usually the target of an insurgency, to provide
services for its citizens, especially those that the insurgents claim are missing or
inadequate. It clearly argues that, without popular support, a government cannot
defeat an insurgency. Essentially, the report describes a strategy by which a
government counters insurgency by winning the hearts and minds of the local
population. Without the fertile soil provided by dissatisfaction among the people,
insurgency cannot take root.
Here at last was the basis for a comprehensive CI doctrine. Whether the
authors of the report truly understood how to win hearts and minds is not clear,
but the steps they describe are those of almost every successful post war CI
operation. Most importantly, the report emphasizes the importance of
fundamental reform to address the grievances of the insurgents. This crucial
aspect of CI was, as I've argued, missing from American doctrine. Why then,
one wonders, did this report arrive on the President's desk by such unusual
channels, almost a year after its appearance? The fact that the report remained
unpublished as a manual suggests that Pentagon leaders did not yet believe it
significant enough to institutionalize its findings. Its title and content suggest that
it was authored by members of the special operations community, a group
roundly disdained by the conventional military at the time. Both factors may help
explain its obscurity.
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Assuming Kennedy read the report, one would expect someone with his
belief in flexible response to quickly transform its contents into doctrine. Given
the appearance of new CI manuals for both the Marine Corps and the Army in
1962, which included some of these lessons, one gathers that Kennedy
embraced this study and its recommendations. My analysis of the execution of
CI programs in Laos will demonstrate whether Kennedy understood the idea of a
holistic approach to communist insurgency and how well he digested the
contents of the Army report.
Events of early 1961 must have galvanized Kennedy's belief in the threat
posed by a relentless, global advance of communism. In March and April of
1961 the Soviets and their allies scored what could only have been perceived as
a series of Cold War triumphs over the Americans. On March 24th
,
for example,
the administration issued a press release claiming that "an unarmed C-47,
assigned to the United States Embassies at Vientiane and Saigon, was shot
down on March 23 over Xieng Khouang province at an altitude of more than
6000 feet... the plane was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, not small arms
fire."
47 Washington rightly viewed this development as critical to the ongoing CI
effort in Laos. At 6000 feet, the American plane almost certainly had to have
been shot down by a Soviet Surface to Air Missile, indicating that, if the Soviets
weren't directly involved, they were providing the Pathet Lao insurgents with
relatively hi-tech weapons, and training them in their use. Two weeks later, on
April 12th , Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin made the world's first successful
manned flight into space. This accomplishment amazed and frightened America,
32
because it indicated that the communists were pulling decisively ahead in the
space race. Who knew what advantages such technology would give them?
Then, on April 17th
,
America and the Kennedy administration were badly
shaken by news of the disastrous events at the Bay of Pigs. The President had
staked much in terms of personal reputation and national prestige on the success
of the invasion. Its failure damaged the credibility of the new administration and
complicated political and diplomatic decision making, as well as making the
accomplishments and advances of global communism seem all the more
relentless. Presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., sent Kennedy a memo
upon returning from a trip to Europe, during which he had tried to gauge
response to the Cuban catastrophe. The overriding sentiment among European
leaders was "shock and disillusion". Europeans, Schlesinger explained to the
President, had placed great faith in the new American administration, and was
deeply disappointed that it had blundered so badly, so early in its tenure.
Moreover, he wrote, European leaders were alarmed that "the Kennedy who
launched the invasion was the real Kennedy—that talk about 'new methods' of
warfare and countering guerrillas represents his real approach to the problems of
the cold war..."
48 What the Europeans did not know was just how right they
were. Kennedy did intend to approach the problems of the cold war with new
methods and by countering guerrillas. He had made some naive decisions, and
his military planning had been woefully inept, but his administration was learning,
and the President was determined to proceed.
47
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In the realm of CI, the failure at the Bay of Pigs meant that covert CI
operations, such as those ongoing in Laos and Vietnam, ran the risk of further
embarrassing the United States, should they fail or be badly compromised.
Kennedy, therefore, saw it as critically important to rebuild his administration's
credibility with its allies, and so put other initiatives on the back burner
temporarily. Among the initiatives that he quashed was direct military
intervention in Laos 49 The Kremlin must have sensed the opportunity presented
by an apprehensive or off-balance Washington. After April they accelerated a
series of airlifts to the Pathet Lao and committed to vast new military intervention
in Cuba, including the fateful decision to place nuclear missiles on the island. 50
With events seemingly turning against the U.S., W.W. Rostow advised
Kennedy that "...the greatest problem we face is not to have the whole of our
foreign policy thrown off by what we say and what we do about Cuba itself...
I
believe we must resume with intensified vigor and perhaps more boldness than
we have heretofore envisaged, the lines of action already under way." Among
those lines, he counseled, was to prove that the U.S. was not "a paper tiger." In
short, what Rostow proposed, and what Kennedy seems to have taken to heart,
was greater care and planning to shore up the administration's reputation, and
intensified diplomacy and non-military intervention techniques. To "redress and
restore" the U.S. position in the international order, Rostow proposed that the
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U.S. should publicize the expansionist, absorptive nature of communism,
advertise their willingness to resort to nuclear blackmail, and offer an American
program of "independence, assistance and partnership" as a contrast. All of this,
he argued, would show the communists, America's allies and the Third World
that the Cuban mishap was an aberration.51
Kennedy appears to have done just what Rostow advised. With his
administration back on its feet, Kennedy returned his attention to the creation and
training of limited-war-capable units. He immediately ordered increased training
for counterinsurgency at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, and he
expanded the number of Special Forces Groups, adding two overseas in
Okinawa and Germany. His emphasis is reflected in his changes to the fiscal
year 1962 Defense Budget. In the area of limited war, the Eisenhower
administration had earmarked no money at all for "readiness, training and
exercises" of limited war units. Kennedy's new budget allocated $149 million. In
virtually every sub-category of Limited War, Kennedy's budget called for vast
increases. In sealift capability the increase was $40 million, in ammunition,
equipment and stock, $204 million and in research and development, Limited
War saw a jump from nothing to $70 million. Overall, Kennedy proposed $582.3
million in increases to the limited warfare budget. Small wonder he created the
stir that Reston so glibly pooh-poohed. Reinforcing the perception that his
emphasis was on flexibility, the same budget saw a $211.5 million decrease in
allocations for Strategic and Continental Air Defense and a $199.3 million
51 W W. Rostow, "The Problem We Face", 21 April 61, NSF, M&M, Policy Planning, JFKL.
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increase in overall Research and Development funds. The New Frontier for the
CI meant newer tactics, better equipment and training and more flexible
responses to communist insurgency.52
The Special Group For Counterinsurgency
After a year in office, with many of his CI initiatives underway, Kennedy
took the unprecedented step of institutionalizing counterinsurgency as a tool of
containment in his administration. On January 18, 1962, Kennedy issued
National Security Action Memorandum #124. Its subject was "Establishment of
the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)." In an administration known for its
think-tank, inner-circle style of decision making, such a group meant that no one
in Kennedy's government could look past CI any longer. The Special Group (CI)
was chaired Kennedy's Military Representative, General Taylor, and included
Robert F. Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Director of the CIA and the Chief Administrator of the Agency for
International Development. The Memorandum that established the Group
outlined its primary missions including, "insuring] proper recognition throughout
the U.S. government that subversive insurgency... is a major form of politico-
military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare." This first mission
suggests that Kennedy perceived resistance to his ideas among some in his
administration and wished to re-emphasize his priorities. The Group's other
52 FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, p.56-65.
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responsibilities included assessing CI doctrine and resources and making
recommendations for their modification, development of CI programs "in
countries and regions specifically assigned to the Special Group (CI) by the
President", and insuring that the emphasis on CI was reflected in the
organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the forces and agencies
charged with carrying out those CI programs. 54 Attached to the memorandum
was a list of the Group's three initial areas of responsibility, Laos, Vietnam and
Thailand. It was sent to the head of each agency involved and was signed "Jack
Kennedy."55 The establishment of the Special Group (CI) was an important step
by Kennedy because it turned his theories and rhetoric about CI into published
policy. It forced recognition of CI's role in national strategy upon the reluctant
and provided an interdepartmental body to synchronize and over watch the
execution of the government's CI policies.
The Special Group (CI) was, for obvious reasons, perceived as quite
important within the Kennedy administration, and indeed it was. Here was a
personal directive from the President to some of his senior staff members to
ensure unity of effort and maximum efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with
counterinsurgency. Here also was institutionalization of the idea that CI had to
involve both civil and military spheres, that it had to address political and
economic issues, as well as diplomatic and military ones. The doctrine that was
being taught at Fort Bragg now had an infrastructure supporting it in Washington.
54
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The lessons of the past decade and half were finally being translated into
workable doctrine and policy.
Scarcely two months after its inception, the Special Group had already
developed quite a track record. In a classified memo dated March 22, 1962,
General Taylor reviewed the group's activities for the President. Among the
things he chose to list were the establishment of a military command in South
Vietnam, the expansion of the Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg,
the elevation of the latter school's commander to Brigadier General level (making
it a prestigious job), inclusion of CI training and qualification among the
requirements for flag-rank promotion across the armed services, codification of
training objectives and programs for the Military Advisory Assistance Group and
the appointment of a flag officer from each service to serve as a CI
representative on the Joint Staff. All of these actions had the approval of the
President.56
In June, with the group's purview expanded to include new hot spots in
Cambodia, Congo, Iran, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela,
the President asked Taylor to have the Special Group draw up a list of the
greatest insurgency threats facing to United States interests. Out of this grew the
group's first list of hot spots. There were 13 countries listed in two groups, critical
and non-critical. Tellingly, only Laos and Vietnam made the critical list.
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The Special Group (Cl)'s most important efforts, it seems, came in trying
to change the mindset of the military. To be sure, there were still many officers
and entire units that neither cared for nor ever expected to engage in CI
operations. But the tide was now against them. By January 1962, Lemnitzer
was able to report to the members of the Group that "the military are taking full
advantage of the laboratory-type approach afforded by the current situation in
Southeast Asia and other areas of the world."58 Among the advances he cited in
military training for CI, were modifications to the curriculum at virtually every level
of military education, from the service academies to the staff and senior service
colleges. All now included instruction in the principles of CI operations. There
was also now specialized CI training for MAAG personnel, as well as increased
emphasis on language expertise.59 It is difficult to tell whether many of these
efforts reflected a thorough understanding of people's war and how to fight it, or if
they were just lip service. The curriculum at the service academies and staff
college, in particular, stands out as a place where lip service and little else might
have been paid to the ideas of CI. Even if the lessons being taught to young
officers amounted little more than admonitions to build schools for the locals and
avoid killing their livestock, such instruction represented a drastic change from
pre-Kennedy days.60
58 General L.L. Lemnitzer, "Military Training Related to CI Matters", 30 January 62, NSF, M&M,
JFKL.
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Current CI instruction remains rudimentary at the junior-officer level, stressing the
minimization of collateral damage and the development of civic works projects. Discussion of
fundamental political and economic change remains un-addressed, as does Maoist theory. There
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In July, Lemnitzer issued another report entitled "Summary of Military CI
Accomplishments Since January 1961." This document boasts that the services
had developed "a strategy of both therapy and prophylaxis". Among the other
accomplishments on the CI front were the training of more than 14000 foreign
officers from 65 countries and the reorganization of the military to include CI
capability in each service. Most importantly, however, he argued that the
greatest gains had been realized "in a peaceful area—helping allied military
forces strengthen the social and economic base of their countries and, in so
doing, to create a better image of themselves."61
If Lemnitzer's assertions are true, then here, at last, are the lessons of the
Philippines and Malaya properly applied. They would not penetrate into doctrinal
manuals immediately. What appears clear from a review of Kennedy's emphasis
on CI is that the right ideas were there, in the minds of a few key advisors, from
the beginning. The evidence also suggests that Kennedy was privy to their
thinking and that he wished his government to espouse a doctrine that included
it. It took a year for him to reverse the momentum of fifteen years of emphasis
on nuclear strategy. By 1962, however, it seems that Kennedy's priorities were
finally being institutionalized throughout his administration. The activities of his
CI operators at Fort Bragg and throughout the Third World were not yet fully
integrated into doctrine, but a lag between training, execution and publication in
doctrinal manuals is not unusual. There is usually a period during which field
seems no reason to assume and I have no evidence to suggest that the situation was any
different in 1962.
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operators experiment with techniques and procedures that are incorporated into
doctrine only after a review has proven them effective, as seems to have been
the case with Kennedy's CI programs. Reviews of previous CI operations as well
as, one assumes, reports from his own operators and trainers, led him to push
his program in the direction he did, a direction that led to the publication or
modification of three new doctrinal manuals for CI in 1963, and 7 more before the
end of the decade. The lag does not negate the fact that what Lemnitzer
reported in July 62 denotes significant progress in the development of CI doctrine
from the top down. It remains to be seen how well this doctrine and Kennedy's
emphasis on CI fared in the "laboratory-type" arena of Laos.62
61 General L.L. Lemnitzer, "Summary of Military CI Accomplishments Since January 1961," 21
July 62, NSF, M&M, JFKL.
62 Downie 53 shows that FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare
and Special Operations Forces, and FM 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces were all
released (or re-released) in 1962 as implementing doctrine for CI operations.
FM 31-16 still
suggested that conventional units could be used effectively in a CI role, but
all of the manuals
discussed the need for civil-military cooperation and the importance of political
action in CI.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POST-WAR QUAGMIRE IN LAOS
Introduction
One cannot hope to understand the Kennedy administration's CI efforts in
Laos without some background into the quagmire of Laotian politics and the
history of American intervention in the kingdom. When President Kennedy
assumed office, Southeast Asia was a region in turmoil. Communist guerrillas
backed, America suspected, by the Soviets and Chinese, clashed with
government forces in both Laos and South Vietnam. Laos was considered
critical because if communists succeeded in conquering it the only thing standing
between them and West-friendly Thailand would be the Mekong River. Between
1955 and 1959, Eisenhower had committed hundreds of military advisors and
over $205 million to ensuring that Laos was not the first domino to fall. The
outgoing President and his staff focused on the situation in Laos during the last
transition meeting held with the incoming Kennedy administration. He warned
the young President-elect that it was the key to the region. "It [is] the cork in the
bottle", Eisenhower's Secretary of State added, telling Kennedy, "If Laos [falls],
then Thailand, the Philippines and of course Chiang Kai-shek [will] go."
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Eisenhower and his advisors spoke from five years of often-difficult experience in
the country. This chapter will examine the development of American intervention
63
Evelyn Lincoln "Notes of Conversation Between President-Elect Kennedy and President
Eisenhower" 19 January 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, 24:19. While several versions of what was
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Goldstein, American Policy in Laos, 1 38. Goldstein places the actual figure
for total aid to Laos
from 1955-59 at $205.4 million, Prados at "over $250 million".
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in Laos to help set the stage upon which Kennedy's CI operations played out. To
do so, I must first explain the nature of the conflict in Laos, as well as the makeup
and motivations of the various factions.
In 1955, Eisenhower began his third year in office with events in Laos
moving quickly and unpredictably. The President maintained that there was a
world communist conspiracy, orchestrated by the Soviet Union, and his thinking
made the danger of Laos falling under communist domination in 1955 seem very
real. The Geneva Accords of July 1954 had ended a bloody period of civil war in
the little kingdom between the Royal Government, supported by the French, and
the communist Pathet Lao, who sought to oust the French from the Kingdom
once and for all. When negotiations for a cease-fire began, a tiny force of Pathet
Lao, about 1500 combat troops, controlled 80% of the country, while the Royal
Army of 20,000 controlled only the Mekong River Valley.64 Goldstein suggests
that the ability of such a small force to control such a vast area is evidence of the
Viet Minh's influence. The aid of the powerful Viet Minh, who were backed by the
North Vietnamese Army and the Soviet Union, would certainly explain the ability
of so few soldiers to hold so much territory. In any case, the Pathet Lao were not
permitted to send a delegate to the negotiations that were to decide, among
other things, the fate of their country. Nevertheless, the Accords included the
Pathet Lao in their decrees.
The Geneva Accords set forth a cease-fire date of August 6
th
,
1954.
Within 120 days after that date, all foreign troops, but specifically, the Viet Minh
64
Goldstein, 73.
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and the French, were to be out of the country. The tenets of the Accords allowed
a small cadre of French military personnel to remain in the country to train the
Royal Lao Army, but military assistance by any other external nation or group
was specifically prohibited 65 Perhaps most fatefully, the Accords provided for a
coalition government that would include both the existing Royal Government and
the communist Pathet Lao. The latter were to consolidate in two northern
provinces of Laos, Phong Saly and Sam Neua, to prepare for the national
elections anticipated sometime in 1955.66
Despite the tenets of the Geneva Accords specifically including the Pathet
Lao in the coalition government, Eisenhower was determined that Laos must be
anti-communist. He was convinced that the Geneva Accords, having partitioned
Vietnam and recognized a communist north, left the door open to the possibility
of communism spreading into Laos. He was, however, hampered in his desire to
intervene because of the prohibition against foreign military personnel in the
country. But with elections approaching and the Pathet Lao demonstrating
alarming popularity, which might translate into strength at the polls, Eisenhower
felt forced to do something to ensure their defeat. Laos's importance to
America's vital national interests may have been negligible, but the symbolic
importance of holding the line against communism was considerable and made
intervention almost inevitable.
65 Between 1955 and 1963 the military forces in Laos that remained loyal to the King and his
government, that is to say, the national army, changed its name several times. For simplicity's
sake, and to differentiate it from the other factions that did not remain loyal to the King and
government, I will refer to the Laotian army as the Royal Lao Army throughout the narrative.
66 FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume XXI, East Asian Security, Cambodia, Laos, 577-578; Foreign
Relations, 1952-54, Volume XVI, 1521, 1540-1543; Goldstein, 66-101.
44
From French Colony To Independent Nation
The story of American intervention in Laos begins, as it does in Vietnam,
with the French empire in Indochina. Like Vietnam, Laos suffered the
ministrations of French colonial rule through most of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. In 1940, as war raged in Europe and Paris fell to the Nazis,
the latter's Axis ally, Japan, began a campaign to seize European colonies in
Southeast Asia. Within a year they controlled most of France's former empire in
Indochina, including Laos. Japanese rule, while harsh, was a critical turning
point for Laos in throwing off the French yoke. Japanese governors, in an effort
to purge European influence, encouraged the growth of nationalism in the region.
In Laos, they went so far as to kidnap the son of Laotian King Sissavong Vong in
a successful attempt to coerce him into declaring an end to French rule.67
Among those who grasped this thread of independence were three
brothers, all intellectuals from the Laotian elite. Princes Phetsarath, Souvanna
Phouma and Souphanouvong initiated and led a Free Lao movement, called Lao
Issara, which declared independence at the end of World War II. This decision
put the Lao Issara at loggerheads with the French, who had launched a post-war
effort to retake their colonies in Indochina and the Royal Government, which
issued a counter-declaration of allegiance to France.
68 The ethnic makeup of the
Lao Issara is unclear, but their leadership came from the ethnic majority lowland
Lao, who also composed most of the Royal Government. The Lao Issara were
67 Conboy, Shadow War, 31-35.
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an example of a united front insurgent movement, whose object was national
independence. The appeals of the Lao Issara and the autonomy granted under
Japanese occupation made reestablishment of a colonial relationship difficult for
the French. French efforts to gain control of the countryside from Lao Issara
guerrillas met with frustration for nearly a year. In 1946 the French sent
paratroopers to finally established order in Laos, prompting the three princes and
the Lao Issara to flee to Bangkok 69
France's chance to celebrate the defeat of the Lao Issara movement was
short, however. In Vietnam, communist Viet Minh guerrillas were gaining ground
and momentum. In an effort to free assets to fight the Viet Minh, the French
granted Laos ever-increasing degrees of autonomy. In 1947 they established a
constitutional monarchy. In 1949, they allowed the Royal Lao Government to
raise an army. With independence seemingly on the way, Prince Souvanna
Phouma and his faction of the Lao Issara returned, with amnesty, to Laos. The
Lao Issara had split during their time in exile over strategy. Souvanna Phouma
favored gradual evolution to independence, believing the French were destined
to eventually abandon Laos. Souphanouvong, the commander of the Lao
Issara's military forces, favored an alliance with the powerful Viet Minh and the
military overthrow of the French. Phetsarath remained in exile, disagreeing with
68
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the introduction of the Viet Minh into the nationalist Laotian movement. 70
Souphanouvong mounted an attack against the French in 1947 and was once
again routed. His tactics further split the Lao Issara, who ejected him from the
movement in 1949 and declared allegiance to the royal government. Shortly
thereafter, the Lao Issara dissolved. 71
Souphanouvong and his followers made their way to North Vietnam,
where they finally allied with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. In August 1950
Souphanouvong established the Pathet Lao, a movement dedicated to the
overthrow of the French and the unification of Laos. Later that year, he
established a political wing of the Pathet Lao, dubbed the First Resistance
Congress of Laos. The latter organization declared a resistance government, the
Neo Lao Issara, the forerunner of the Laotian Communist Party. While
Souvanna Phouma led a nationalist political movement in Vientiane that was
loyal to the royal government, the burgeoning Pathet Lao began receiving arms
and training from the Viet Minh. In 1953 the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh
launched the first of three joint invasions of northern Laos. By the end of 1 953
the invaders had gained control of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, two of the
provinces in northern Laos.72 As Goldstein points out, the Pathet Lao maintained
an amazingly effective veil of secrecy around their organization. There is
evidence to show that the Viet Minh heavily influenced the Pathet Lao. The
Pathet Lao carried arms and wore uniforms provided by the Viet Minh. There
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were Vietnamese advisors with their units in the field. Most tellingly, the two
forces repeatedly joined forces to attack the French and the Royal Lao Army.
Aside from this cooperation, very little is known about the Pathet Lao and
many questions remain. Goldstein asks, for example, how dedicated they really
were to communist ideology. Were they true communists, or only insofar as it
earned them the support of the Vietnamese? The Pathet Lao were present at a
conference sponsored by Vietnam in 1951 at which communist front movements
in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (represented by the Pathet Lao) agreed to an
alliance. But this does not prove that they were dedicated communists. It was at
the same meeting that the Viet Minh agreed to aid the Pathet Lao, so the latter
group could have been paying lip service to communist ideology in an effort to
gain much needed support.73 The Pathet Lao were very dependent on the Viet
Minh for aid, but I do not believe they shared the latter group's ideological purity.
The Pathet Lao's tactics were a mix of people's war and united front. They used
propaganda and selective terror, including assassination, to coerce the reluctant
into cooperation. They also set up schools and provided basic government
72
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services in some areas to gain support. 74 Such an unusual mix of tactics is
inconsistent with pure Marxism or people's war.
Paul Langer and Joseph Zasloff have argued that, while Souphanouvong
did study in France during the height of the popular front movement there, he
was not an ideologically zealous communist. His rhetoric did not reflect Marxist
theory, nor did any of the Pathet Lao's propaganda. These two historians also
note that, upon his return from France, despite his excellent professional and
academic qualifications, the French assigned him to an unimportant post,
heightening his resentment of French rule. 75
It seems likely, therefore, given Souphanouvong's background and his
unfavorable experiences with the colonial government, that the Pathet Lao were
less ideologically motivated than they were bent on the eradication of French
colonialism. The economic, social and political natures of the country support the
latter assertion. As Langer and Zasloff make clear, Laos is not a land of haves
and have-nots in the same way that many Third World countries are. It is a
country of small villages, largely isolated from one another and the world at large.
The government, any government, wields little influence over the routine events
of a villager's life and the villager, in return, seems to seek little from the
government. More importantly, the average Laotian shows little interest in
national, let alone global politics. Because so few Laotians are politically active,
either by geography or apathy, the influence of a few elite families tends to be
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exaggerated. Souphanouvong came from one of these families. 76 If economic
inequity was not an issue in Laos, and there was no evidence of Marxism in the
Pathet Lao's platform, while there was anti-French and, later, anti-U.S. rhetoric,
one must conclude that the Pathet Lao were a united front independence
movement.
Having identified the Pathet Lao as a united front, one is able to more
clearly define the nature of their insurgency. They were not fighting a true
people's war as Mao defined it. Neither economic reform, nor land redistribution
seems to have been their object so much as national independence and an end
to colonialism. But if Langer and Zasloff are correct, that most Laotians sought
little from and cared little about the government, how did a Pathet Lao
independence movement gain support? Their support was based largely on the
combination of greater independence granted by Japan and then France,
followed by the shock of return to French rule. The beginnings of the Lao Issara
movement are first discernible in the period of French reintroduction into Laos,
which makes the latter argument plausible. Langer and Zasloff argue that the
same period saw a rise in the influence of the Vietnamese in Laos. There is an
ancient animosity between ethnic Laos and the Vietnamese, and this animosity
helped foment a movement aimed at placing the fate of Laos in the hands of
Laotians. The latter movement eventually became the Lao Issara, which later
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split into two camps, one that favored the Vietnamese (Souphanouvong's Pathet
Lao) and one that did not. 77
It is difficult to conclude confidently that the Pathet Lao succeeded in
stirring nationalist sentiment in notoriously apathetic Laos. One must remember,
however, that the Pathet Lao were a relatively small movement, albeit with a big
influence. Because they were small, they did not need a massive support
structure, although they had one in the Viet Minn. It seems likely that the Pathet
Lao were able to gain power based on appeals to what nationalists there were
among the politicized elements in the country, and maintain it with a combination
of propaganda, assistance to the populace, selective terror and copious aid from
the Vietnamese.
The Royal Lao Government's loyalty to its French patrons was hinged on
the latter's ability to protect the Kingdom from the communist insurgents, a task
which was becoming increasingly difficult. Viet Minh incursions into Laos were
becoming larger and harder to defeat. The Pathet Lao, who followed on the
heels of invading Viet Minh forces, gained popular support as the French proved
less and less able to protect their provincial subjects. In a final effort to prevent
the Viet Minh from overwhelming northeastern Laos, the French prepared their
final stand at a strongpoint constructed at Dien Bien Phu, just across the border
in North Vietnam. The intent of this large, well-armed base was to deter the Viet
Minh from crossing the frontier into Laos, as they had done twice before, and
threatening the old royal capital of Luang Prabang.
Ibid., 23-29.
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Dien Bien Phu's fatal flaw, however, was its location in the center of a
valley. The French had calculated, incorrectly, that the enemy would be unable
to get artillery into the mountains surrounding the base. This miscalculation cost
them dearly. The Viet Minh laid siege to the French strongpoint, while marching
other forces around it to threaten Luang Prabang. After nearly four months, Dien
Bien Phu fell to the communists on May 7, 1954. The French could not last long
after losing their largest base, and they soon negotiated an end to their reign in
Indochina, at Geneva in July 1954. But the end of French rule was not such an
unqualified boon for Laos.
As I have implied, Laos was a nation mostly in name. It was made up of
several different ethnic groups, separated generally into mountain tribes and
lowland Lao. Many of the former lived in small, scattered villages along the
rugged spine of the country and recognized no national boundaries or allegiance
to any government save their own local elders. The lowland Lao, or Lao Loum,
were by far the largest ethnic group in Laos, at 1.7 million. They outnumbered
the combined highland tribes, which included the aboriginal Lao Theung, and the
more recently arrived Lao T'ai, Hmong and Yao about two to one. There were
also significant Chinese and Vietnamese minorities in southern Laos. This mix
defied easy governance and virtually ensured that the minority highlanders, who
were by no means unified in beliefs or allegiances, were underrepresented in the
government. To make matters worse, the politicized segments of Laotian
society, primarily lowlanders, were often split over the question of the Pathet
Lao's legitimacy and the role of the French in the royal government. The political
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disarray contributed to the conditions that allowed a communist, united front
insurgency to blossom in Laos. 78
Despite the mandate in the Geneva Accords that foreign troops evacuate
Laos, by the August 5th cease-fire date, 4,000 Viet Minh guerrillas remained in
Laos. They occupied positions throughout the country, save the Mekong River
valley. The Pathet Lao, whom the Geneva Accords had instructed to move to the
northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, were doing something more
than consolidating and regrouping. They effectively seized control of both
provinces and began governing them, almost as a separate nation, even
providing some basic governmental services to the populace. 79 The Royal Lao
Army was in disarray after nearly five years of struggle against the guerrilla
tactics of the communist forces, and with the departure of most of their French
allies, they were rendered incapable of coercing compliance with the Geneva
agreements from either the Viet Minh or the Pathet Lao. 80
Two months after Geneva, with many French bureaucrats still holding
cabinet posts in the Royal Lao Government, and the Lao National Army suffering
losses to the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao in the field despite the presence of 1500
French advisors, Laotian King Sissavong Vong solicited direct American
78 Dommen, Keystone of Indochina, 1-7. The population figures are Dommen's estimates;
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assistance. The old King claimed that without it, his national army would be
financially bankrupt and incapable of further operations after January 1955.81
The growth of the communist Pathet Lao as a threat to the royal
government and the continued influence of the Viet Minh forced the United
States to sit up and take notice of Laos. The U.S. position on Indochina had,
until this point, been primarily one of sideline support for their French ally. The
Eisenhower administration needed French agreement on several issues in
Europe aimed at preventing the spread of communism there. As a consequence,
the Americans were unwilling to alienate the French by implying that the French
could not handle the situation in Indochina by themselves. Embroiled in a
climate of post-war anti-communism, and firmly believing himself to be facing a
relentless communist drive for world domination, Eisenhower saw French defeat
at Dien Bien Phu as a sign that the communist insurgency in Laos also posed a
major regional threat. By the eve of the Geneva conference, he began to
consider an aid program to bolster the Royal Lao Government.
Early United States Intervention
In response to the Royal Lao Government's pleas for help, the
Eisenhower administration established a diplomatic mission in Vientiane, and
sent Charles W. Yost to be the first American ambassador to the Kingdom. Yost
was to preside over several programs designed to bolster the Royal Lao
Government by promoting economic, public health and educational
improvements, as well as indirect military aid, routed through a loophole in the
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Accords. To assist the Mission with the military aspects of aid to Laos, on
December 13, 1954, the U.S. established the Programs Evaluation Office in the
Mission at Vientiane.82
Prevented by the Geneva agreements from engaging in direct military
intervention in Laos, Eisenhower's Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to use "U.S.
civilians with military experience". Consequently, the Programs Evaluations
Office was staffed by a group of unusually fit, well-groomed men. Not
coincidentally, many of these men had been discharged from military service,
often in Special Operations, only days before their assignment to the PEO.83
The PEO was the consummate diplomatic exploitation of a gap in treaty
language. Based on a 1950 agreement, the U.S. was allowed to supply their
French ally with arms and equipment for their war in Indochina. They reasoned,
therefore, that they had a demonstrable need to "receive and oversee the
equipment and make sure it was properly used." The U.S. could not train the
Royal Lao Army, but the French could, and the Americans could ensure the
French did it correctly. The PEO was, therefore, really a conduit for funds and
equipment to the Royal Lao Army. The U.S. Mission quickly found itself funding
virtually the entire operating budget of the Lao National Army and providing
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significant quantities of military hardware besides. The non-military aspects of
the Mission continued, but were vastly overshadowed by the military spending. 84
Among the non-military programs the U.S. Mission initiated were: a
highway building program to improve road access to the interior, a ferry program
for the Mekong River to provide a vital trading link with neighboring Thailand, and
a rural health care program dubbed Booster Shot.85 These operations,
particularly Booster Shot, were designed in part to aid the Royal Government in
the elections of 1958 by showing that they could care for their citizens. They
were, in short, attempts to eliminate the problems that the communist Pathet Lao
insurgents exploited to gain local support. Eisenhower may not have understood
the nuances of CI, but there were those in his administration, especially in the
CIA, who did.
Together the non-military programs totaled roughly $5 million and did not
prevent the communists from carrying the elections. The aid programs were rife
with corruption and much of the money and equipment sent for construction and
rural improvement programs found their way into the pockets of Laotian officials
in charge of their management.
In contrast, American military aid to Laos from 1955-59 amounted to
roughly $40 million per year, plus nearly $4 million between 1958-59 for a military
pay raise for the Royal Lao Army. The $40 million was intended to stimulate the
Laotian economy, but apparently far exceeded the economy's ability to absorb
Castle, 14-17; Goldstein, 166.
Goldstein, ibid.
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capital. Goldstein argues that this fact is affirmed by the accumulation of a $40
million surplus by the Royal Government in these years, the equivalent of an
entire year's aid. 86
With an army bolstered by U.S. aid providing a degree of stability, and the
integration of Pathet Lao forces seemingly underway, the Royal Lao Government
held the Geneva-mandated free elections in May 1958. They were surprised
when the Pathet Lao legally won nine of the ten seats it contested in the election.
Among those elected was Souphanouvong, the once-exiled Prince and leader of
the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao-allied Santiphab party carried four more, giving
the communists control over 13 of 21 available seats and drastically altering the
balance of power in Vientiane.87 This turn of events perplexed and alarmed the
Eisenhower administration, but apparently not many of the Laotians. In the
opinion of Ambassador Yost, the Laotian government did not consider the Pathet
Lao true communists, but rather "wayward brothers who will return patriotically to
fold once reasonable give and take [is] presented," and so negotiations to
integrate the newly elected communists with the existing royalists continued. 88
There is little evidence to explain the Pathet Lao's electoral victory in
1958. Their military power derived from Viet Minh support, but the source of their
political power is harder to pinpoint. It seems likely, however, that their popular
support derived from the strength of their united front tactics against the French.
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Simply stated, their electoral victories suggest that politically aware Laotians
supported their drive to oust the French and unify the country. Many of these
Laotians must have agreed with Souphanouvong's assessment of the royal
government as a puppet of the French. This assessment appears accurate,
based on Souvanna Phouma's appointment as Prime Minister in November
1951
.
Souvanna's appointment must have struck some Laotians as both
suspicious and galling, given his easy acquiescence to the reintroduction of
French authority and the dissolution of the Lao Issara without independence
having been achieved.
In reaction to the newly legitimized communist influence in the Royal Lao
Government, a group of right wing politicians formed the Committee for the
Defense of National Interests. As the radical anti-communist voice in Laos, this
party won U.S. support, prompting neutralist Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone,
appointed after Geneva, to embrace a "more pro-Western brand of neutrality."89
Part of the 1954 agreement that had formed the coalition government was
the provision that the 1 st and 2nd Pathet Lao Battalions would be integrated into
the Royal Lao Army and stationed in their home territory on the Plain of Jars,
where they had already established strong defenses and a base of support. As it
became clear in the Spring and Summer of 1959 that the right wing of the
Phoui's government was pursuing a firmly anti-communist policy and would not
Conboy, 18-19.
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allow the Pathet Lao to assume their duly-elected place in the coalition
government, these two battalions balked at integration. 90
The downward spiral of events accelerated when the Royal Lao
Government, angered by this perceived waffling on the part of the Pathet Lao,
had the Royal Army surround the soldiers on the Plain and issue an ultimatum to
the recalcitrant communists. At this point, the Royal Army posed a moderate
threat to the Pathet Lao under the best of circumstances, but they had a superior
position and had caught the Pathet Lao somewhat by surprise. Facing long odds
and a tough fight, the 1 st Battalion capitulated. The 2nd Battalion seized the
opportunity provided by a rainy night and fled the Plain for North Vietnam on May
18th
.
After a brief pursuit and skirmish, the communists escaped across the
border. Upon hearing the news, Phoui had Souphanouvong and his communist
cohorts placed under house arrest. 91
The escape of an entire battalion of communist fighters into North
Vietnam, as well as the subsequent desertion of hundreds more who had already
integrated into the Royal Lao Army, prompted the Eisenhower administration to
escalate its involvement in Laotian affairs. Until this point, it appears that the
PEO had restricted its role to training and advising. There were only six field
officers staffing the PEO until January 1959, when newly-appointed Programs
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Evaluations Office director John Heintges, a rising Army Brigadier General
discharged from service to take the post in Laos, requested a drastic increase in
manpower. The organization in Laos grew to include 65 administrators, (all
World War II veterans of Heintges' unit in the 3 rd Infantry Division, which had
fought across France and Germany), and 12 teams of eight special operations
soldiers each, deployed to Laos on six month tours. These special operations
forces, nominally under the command and control of the PEO, were part of an
operation called Hotfoot. Collectively dubbed the Lao Training Advisory Group
(LTAG), the soldiers of Hotfoot were led by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Bull"
Simons, a veteran of Ranger and OSS units in World War II and one of the
pioneers of American Special Operations. 92 The LTAGs set up shop at four
French training sites throughout the country and, alongside their French
counterparts, began training Royal Lao Army units in the use and care of all
manner of weapons, from small arms to rocket launchers and mortars. 93
Hotfoot sputtered to a halt as quickly as it started when the Royal Lao
Army lost four outposts in the province of Sam Neua. The Royal Army reacted
by mounting an aggressive campaign against the 2 nd Pathet Lao Battalion (the
one that had escaped the Plain of Jars the previous May), but without much
success. U.S. intervention in the Sam Neua incident was limited to airlift of
supplies, although the Eisenhower administration did move Joint Task Force 116,
According to Hamilton-Merritt, Colonel Simons would lead the U.S. raid on the Son Tay
prison in North Vietnam in 1970.
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composed of Marines, airpower and special operations forces into a staging
position in the South China Sea, should the communists make a determined
push into Laos. As quickly as the fighting had flared, however, it died down, and
Hotfoot found new life. 94
By the end of 1959, the Programs Evaluations Office had grown to over
175 civilians and 107 Special Forces trainers and constituted the largest U.S.
military assistance program in Southeast Asia. 95 Despite this, in December, the
Royal Government in Vientiane began to come apart at the seams, although this
time, it was not the communists doing the tearing.
Royalist Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone, long at odds with the right wing
Committee for the Defense of National Interests, extended the term of the
National Assembly, his last bastion of power, through the scheduled elections of
April 1960. This action, he hoped, would prevent the elections and his inevitable
defeat at the polls.96 With the time thus bought, he hoped to strike a decisive
blow against the communists and thereby regain some of his constituents'
support. Luck was not with him, however.
In response to Phoui's action, the Committee, led by Colonel Phoumi
Nosovan, the Deputy Minister of National Security and Army Chief of Staff,
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staged a coup, with the backing of the CIA in Vientiane. 97 Military forces loyal to
Phoumi surrounded the Prime Minister's residence and demanded his
resignation. A rising young star in the Royal Lao Army, Captain Kong Le,
deployed his paratroopers to maintain order throughout Vientiane. The next
morning, the coup ended successfully, and bloodlessly, when the King received
Phoui's resignation.
The Eisenhower administration split over whom to support in the power
struggle between semi-neutralist Phoui Sananikone and rightist Phoumi
Nosavan. Many in the State Department worried that Phoumi's militant image
would taint the government and drive people to the Pathet Lao camp. The anti-
Phoumists were supported by the assessment of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos,
who did not consider Phoumi a particularly skilled politician. Phoui eventually
won America's support, albeit hardly enthusiastic, with the help of pressure from
Britain, France and Australia, all of whom favored Phoui Sananikone.98 The
confusion over who to support suggests that events in Laos were not clear to
Washington in 1959 and that Eisenhower was unsure of who provided the best
chance to keep the communists out of the government. In any case, Phoui was
ousted and Phoumi came to dominate the government set up after the coup.
Following the coup, the King installed an interim Prime Minister, Kou
Abhay, and promoted Phoumi to Minister of Defense. The CDNI was in power,
and the CIA had helped put them there. But with four months until the next
97 Sananikone, 47-^9; Stevenson, 88.
98 Stevenson, 87-89.
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elections, Heintges and the Eisenhower administration were eager to ensure that
he stayed there. The PEO and U.S. Embassy staff set to work at a fever pitch,
setting up medical clinics in the backcountry and air dropping supplies to isolated
hamlets throughout Laos in the hope of galvanizing support for the new, pro-
western government."
The elections held on April 24, 1960 were a sham. Ballot box stuffing and
fraudulent counting, also apparently orchestrated by the CIA, ensured a victory
for the right wing Committee for the Defense of National Interests, which was
also a victory for the U.S. 100 The Pathet Lao was out of government and the
newly elected Royal Lao Government was (again) pro-west. The Royal Lao
Army was making strides toward becoming a viable fighting force and beginning
to see the fruits of its counterinsurgency efforts. Then, on the morning of May
24th
,
Souphanouvong and the rest of the Pathet Lao leadership, still imprisoned
at Camp Phonekheng, were allowed to escape by complicit prison guards. 101
The stage was thus set for a communist resurgence and the onset of a crisis in
Laos.
Kong Le's Coup
The next crisis in Vientiane would come from within. Following the
Committee for the Defense of National Interest's successful coup, paratrooper
commander Kong Le found himself and his men constantly deployed on one wild
99 Sananikone, 52-60.
100 Sananikone, 58; Stevenson, 88.
63
goose chase after another. When they weren't deployed, the elite unit was
quartered in ramshackle huts on the mud flats outside of Vientiane. Kong Le
protested both the misuse and mistreatment of his soldiers, but he found the
Royal Lao Army general staff unsympathetic to his soldier's needs and almost
hopelessly corrupt. 102
The son of aboriginal Lao Theung peasants, Kong Le had enlisted in the
Royal Lao Army at the age of 17. He had exhibited enough skill to be granted an
appointment to the French-run officer candidate school, from which he graduated
without much distinction. He remained in the Army after it was reduced in size
following the Geneva Accords and in 1958, he volunteered and was accepted for
the Army's paratroop unit as its executive officer. His first action with the
paratroopers was during the Sam Neua fracas, when they were deployed to fight
the Pathet Lao, a mission he considered unwarranted based on the insurgents'
habit of going to ground in the face of superior forces. He had acquitted himself
well as acting commander of the paratroopers during the CDNI's coup, and
enjoyed the loyalty of the toughest, most elite soldiers in his nation's army. 103
After the coup, Kong Le came to believe that the Royal Lao Army generals
were stealing American aid meant to arm and train Laotian forces, including his
paratroopers. Exasperated by this corruption, he came to see a neutralist,
coalition government that would include the Pathet Lao and be unfettered by the
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corrupting influences of either Soviet or American aid, as the only viable
alternative and he began developing a plan to make his idea a reality. After
months of incessant operations in which his soldiers were routinely misused,
including one mistaken incursion into Cambodia during which the unit's calls for
help were ignored, Kong Le assembled his men and outlined his plans to seize
the government. He found nearly unanimous support among his men for his
plan.
104
At 0300 on August 9th
,
Kong Le's battalion initiated its coup. They seized
the Royal Lao Army's headquarters in Vientiane, blocked the main road through
the city, secured the central bank, radio station and telephone exchange and
arrested the commander of the Royal Lao Army in his bedroom. 105 Kong Le's
forces achieved control of the city in less than four hours with only six casualties.
i
But the difficulties were just beginning for him, his country and the United States.
Kong Le installed Prince Souvanna Phouma, a left-leaning neutralist, as
I
Prime Minister and initiated cooperation with the Pathet Lao. Both moves
alarmed American policy makers and pro-west Laotian leaders alike. In
response, General Phoumi Nosovan, late of the Royal Lao Army, began a
i
I
counter-coup against Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma that resulted in a series of
bloody skirmishes and ended with the Battle of Vientiane in December 1960.
Phoumi prevailed in his counter-coup, and forced Kong Le and the Pathet Lao to
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flee north, while Souvanna Phouma and most of his government abandoned their
posts, and their country, for safe haven in Cambodia. 106
Shortly after they fled the city, Kong Le's forces and the Pathet Lao asked
for and received the first of a series of airlifts of military equipment from the
Soviets, by way of Hanoi. Meanwhile, the King dismissed the absent
government of Souvanna Phouma and, on December 14th 1960, installed Prince
Buon Oum as Prime Minister and Phoumi Nosovan as his Deputy. This
provisional government consisted primarily of lowland Lao, and Boun Oum
liberally distributed cabinet posts among his family and loyal supporters. 107
The Situation as Kennedy Found It
Kennedy was sworn in shortly after his counterpart, Boun Oum, in Laos.
He inherited a messy situation that defied easy answers but demanded his
attention. In Laos, Boun Oum and the Royal Lao Government were upright, but
wobbly, with Souvanna's government in exile refuting their claims to legitimacy.
Most of the military was loyal to Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi, and therefore to
the royal government. The same was not necessarily true of the Laotian
peasantry. The Royal Government was largely nepotistic and represented few of
the nation's ethnic groups save lowland Lao. Adding to the mix, Souvanna
Phouma still claimed to be the rightful Prime Minister of Laos, despite having
been dismissed by the King. Meanwhile, on the Plain of Jars, Souvanna
Phouma's former Information Minister claimed that he was the only legitimate
106 Dean Rusk, "Information Paper: Laos", 27 March 61, NSF, Countries, Laos, JFKL.
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representative of the neutralist government, having remained with Kong Le
during the Battle of Vientiane, and following the latter's evacuation of the capital.
Internally, Buon Oum's government was unpopular and suffered regular
harassment from Kong Le and the Pathet Lao. Outside of Vientiane the Boun
Oum government was hard pressed to wield much real power at all. The PEO
continued its operation, although the fighting in Vientiane interrupted their
program. The infrastructure built up since 1955 and emanating from the U.S.
Mission at Vientiane remained mostly intact.
Externally, the Royal Lao Government enjoyed little support from anyone
besides the United States, which was primarily interested in them as an
alternative to the communists. In contrast, Kong Le and the Pathet Lao were
backed strongly by the North Vietnamese, and the communist world almost
unanimously supported Souvanna Phouma's claim to the Prime Ministership.
Kennedy did not have a particularly reliable ally in Vientiane. His staff
assessed the Boun Oum government as unpredictable and unreliable, saying,
"The Boun Oum government is not particularly amenable to United States advice
and tends to act without consultation."
108 He would find out in February 1961,
that their assessment was all too accurate.
Boun Oum was in a difficult position. The insurgent Pathet Lao held the
Plain of Jars and the vital road networks that criss-crossed it. They also had the
militarily and politically powerful Viet Minh supporting them. They continued to
receive supplies from the Soviet Union as well, vastly strengthening their hold
on
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northern Laos. The Royal Government, for its part, had few allies and the only
external aid it received came from the U.S., in quantities that did not compensate
for its other liabilities. Thus stuck, Buon Oum and the King issued a declaration
of Laotian neutrality on February 19, 1961 and began seeking a negotiated
peace with Souvanna Phouma and his supporters. The declaration was not what
the U.S. hoped for in Laos, but the Kennedy administration publicly supported it.
The problem for the Royal Lao Government in trying to reach a settlement
was that they were negotiating from a position of weakness. The problem for
Kennedy was that Laotian neutrality, while it offered a non-communist alternative,
meant that the U.S. would be forced to stand on the sidelines in Laos. Kennedy
apparently felt that such a predicament left him open to Republican attacks. He
needed to appear tough on communism, especially early in his tenure, and
accepting neutrality might be perceived as allowing a loophole that the
communists could slip through. Kennedy's margin notes on the above
information paper indicate the sensitivity of the matter politically. In an apparent
effort to express support for Laos without alienating Republicans in Congress,
who opposed neutrality as the first step towards communism, he substituted the
phrase "The U.S. favors a neutral Laos, independent and not aligned with either
political bloc" to the earlier "The U.S. does not oppose a neutral policy for Laos,
so long as the Lao government desires it and it can in fact be maintained."
109
In
the climate of the Cold War, Kennedy couched his language on Laos carefully,
so that it would be difficult for his opponents to find fodder to use against
Democrats in the mid-term elections and again in 1964.
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American money and personnel had been tied up in Laos since the
inception of the PEO program in 1955. Support had waned in 1959, with the rise
of the neutralists, then waxed again as with the Pathet Lao attacks in Sam Neua.
By 1960, with Kong Le's neutralist coup demonstrating the continued instability of
the country, the PEO and the CIA were waging what was, for all intents and
purposes, a covert war in Laos. National prestige was, as always, closely linked
to its apparent success or failure in foreign policy. 110
Laos presented Kennedy with potential political embarrassment on two
fronts, international and domestic. There was no guarantee that the communist
insurgents would negotiate with the Royal Government and many of Kennedy's
advisors believed that the military situation in the country was virtually
untenable. 111 All of the American aid and training of the previous six years would
therefore amount to nothing if the Soviets were allowed to continue openly
supplying pro-communist forces in northern Laos. The perception on the part of
the international community, in that case, would have been one of victory for the
communists. U.S. prestige would have suffered. In the months after the Bay of
Pigs, especially, this possibility would weigh heavily on Kennedy.
More importantly, previous aid aside, if Laos were allowed to fall, Kennedy
was told, the entire region might too. In the climate of the Cold War, that could
not be allowed to happen. Kennedy had run on a platform critical of
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Eisenhower's containment strategy. He had been elected with a minority of the
popular vote and knew that, unless he appeared to maintain a hard line against
communism, he would open himself up to Republican attack. Moreover, he
believed the American people would not tolerate another war on the scale of
Korea. Their stomach for casualties in a war with which they had trouble
identifying had, he believed, doomed Truman, and he would not tempt the same
fate.
With covert operations still underway in Laos, Kennedy had three choices:
escalation to conventional war, escalation of counterinsurgency operations and a
covert war, or an abandonment of military operations and an increased
diplomatic effort. The new President chose the middle path, and the U.S.,
already ankle deep in the murky waters of Laos, sank in to its knees. 112
The overriding consideration of the Eisenhower administration's policies in
Laos had been hard-line containment of communism. The Kennedy
administration, led by a pragmatic young politician with an affinity for covert
operations and counterinsurgency promised to offer something different.
Apparent acceptance of neutrality had to be followed by tangible, demonstrable
action to ensure the American people believed that the President had not
surrendered Laos to the communists. Failure to do that, he knew, would spell
political disaster.
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For the Pathet Lao, the transition from French colonial rule to American
aid must have seemed quick and complete. Indeed, the communists appear to
have shifted easily from resisting one to resisting the other. The installation of
what seemed to the nationalist Pathet Lao to be an American puppet government
to replace the departed French puppet government ensured that their insurgency
would continue.
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CHAPTER 3
KENNEDY'S COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN LAOS
Introduction
John F. Kennedy was getting advice on the situation in Laos even before
he took office. His incoming administration, particularly his inner circle, knew of
his predilection for covert operations and his belief in CI as a tool of containment.
Moreover, the outgoing Eisenhower administration had stressed the importance
of Laos and the tenuous nature of its government's hold on political power. A
telegram from the American Embassy in Vientiane to the Department of State
outlined the situation succinctly for Kennedy, saying: "military prospect is at best
protracted struggle which holds out little hope for security and integrity of country
in near future... this effort requires material help on political, economic and
psychological side in terms of countering the [Pathet Lao] anti-[government]
effort... I believe it is an illusion to hope that the US alone supporting the Lao
armed forces... can establish security in Laos... a political solution is essential." 113
Coming as it did at the very beginning of Kennedy's presidency, and from
the country that presented him with his first diplomatic crisis, this assessment
must have confirmed two things in the President's mind. First was the need a
flexible response capability generally, second was the need for a CI campaign in
Laos specifically. Before he could act decisively in Laos, however, Kennedy
needed to be brought up to speed on the situation in the country and the nature
and status of ongoing US intervention. His first month in office was, therefore,
113 American Embassy in Vientiane to the Secretary of State, Telegram 1364, 18 January
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characterized by a thorough policy review. While he had the luxury of a relative
lull in the cycle of coup and counter-coup in Laos between the end of December
1960 and February 1961, getting a clear picture of what was going on was no
easy task. Intelligence gathering was made even more complicated by the fact
that, even as he was trying to discern the situation and formulate a workable
response, there were ongoing US operations in Laos that often impacted the
ever-changing political picture.
Kennedy's Beliefs Confirmed
With two Prime Ministers claiming legitimacy, Kong Le cooperating with
the Pathet Lao and the Soviets supplying the communist insurgents, the situation
Kennedy faced in Laos was anything but clear. What was clear in the early
weeks of his presidency was that Laos was quickly turning into the scene of a
potential superpower showdown. The President believed that he needed to
convince the Soviets that he was willing to fight over Laos, while pursuing a
political solution to the dilemma. The solution he sought appears to have
included the possibility of a truly neutral government in Vientiane, rather than the
staunchly anticommunist government insisted on by Eisenhower. Such a policy
was a major shift for US diplomacy in Southeast Asia.
To ensure the establishment of a neutral government, Kennedy would
have to mount a detailed, effective CI program that would eliminate the fuel used
by the Pathet Lao to build popular support. With American CI doctrine still
strongly reflecting the experiences of Korea and the opinions of a conventionally
minded Pentagon, the President faced an uphill battle. He had to impose his
73
limited war program on the military before it could be put into action in Laos.
Fortunately for the President, the CIA and military personnel operating in Laos
tended to be experienced special operators, who thought about CI in terms of
light forces and small units. While many of their strategies and tactics remained
a far cry from the holistic approach favored by Kennedy, they were closer than
their counterparts in the Pentagon. Laos, therefore, promised to test the existing
CI doctrine, even as it served as a laboratory in which to develop the new.
Kennedy would soon find that domestic political pressure was also part of
the decision making mix. On January 21, 1961, Kennedy received a lengthy
memorandum from Senator Mike Mansfield regarding the "Laotian Situation".
The Senator had been contacted directly by Souvanna Phouma, who complained
bitterly about the course of events in Laos and the status of U.S. intervention.
Phouma's chief complaints, which Mansfield apparently agreed with, were the
tendency of the U.S. to back prominent Laotians while ignoring the less
prominent, the exaggeration of the threat of communism in the country (Phouma
insisted that there were "less than 100" Laotian communists), and what he
perceived as the blocking of neutrality. The Senator added to this list his own
indictment that aid to Laos would have a "corrupting and disrupting effect... on an
unsophisticated nation such as Laos." Mansfield followed up his complaint with a
list of recommendations aimed at creating a neutral Laos. The way to do that, he
argued, was to create a neutralization commission composed of India, Pakistan
and Afghanistan. The key to it all, however, was a cutback in U.S. military
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intervention, either by reintroducing the French as trainers, or by introducing a
new, Asian-based training team created for the purpose
In a follow up memo, Mansfield expressed his belief that such a course of
action would accomplish a number of important diplomatic goals. First, a
neutralization commission would put Asians in charge of what Mansfield judged
was "essentially an Asian problem." Second, it would make the U.S. immune
from charges of "imperial meddling" in Laotian affairs, and would force the
Soviets and Chinese to abstain from intervention as well, or face such charges.
Finally, it would allow the U.S. to extricate itself "from an untenable over-
commitment..." 114
It is a small wonder, given the assessment of the embassy in Vientiane
and pressure from within his own government, that Kennedy decided against
escalation to conventional military force in Laos. He must have been more
convinced than ever that a dedicated, broad-spectrum CI campaign was required
to address the thorny problems of Laos.
Ongoing Operations in Laos
There were at least three operations underway in Laos when Kennedy
took over. The first, and perhaps best known, was an Air America operation that
provided airlift of supplies and personnel to the Royal Army. Throughout the
PEO's tenure, the CIA's de facto aviation wing had conducted airlifts to Royal
Army units in Laos, usually from bases in Thailand. During Phoumi's counter-
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coup in December 1960, these airlifts had proven critical to the Army's ability to
successfully drive Kong Le's forces from Vientiane.
The second operation that Kennedy inherited was the Royal Army training
conducted by the U.S. Army Special Forces and supervised by the PEO. While
still nominally a civilian operation, the PEO had taken an increasing role in
training the Royal Army since the rightist coup that had brought Phoui
Sananikone to power in early 1959. First dubbed Hotfoot, this mission would
change names and expand under Kennedy's watch.
The third ongoing operation was, as far as can be determined, a CIA
mission based in Thailand and focused on training small units of special police to
patrol the border and defend against Chinese insurgent activity. These special
Thai units were called Police Aerial Reinforcement Units (PARU), and their
training included a graduation exercise that parachuted them into insurgent-
contested areas. 115 Since 1957, small groups of Lao soldiers, mostly from the
paratroop battalions, had also trained with these units in Thailand. Following
Kong Le's coup in 1960, PARU units had accompanied Phoumi's forces when
they recaptured the city.
None of these were CI operations in the mold of the British operation in
Malaya. To wit, none addressed the basic problems exploited by the Pathet Lao.
None stressed civil-military cooperation. All were expressly intended, as befitted
Eisenhower's beliefs on limited warfare, with fighting the enemy, rather than
addressing the political, economic or social questions plaguing the country.
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Given Kennedy's beliefs about CI, one would expect subsequent operations to
reflect a more flexible approach. It remains to be seen how well his beliefs were
translated into action.
Evolving Intervention
In the waning days of his presidency, Eisenhower had approved a
program to arm and train the Hmong, a mountain tribe of northern Laos. That
program, initially called Operation Momentum, was in its opening stages in
January 1961, but quickly became one of the centerpieces of American
intervention. With the Royal Government controlling little of the territory north of
Vientiane and the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces still a threat, Kennedy expanded
the operation.
CIA operative Bill Lair, a longtime veteran of Southeast Asia, and the
father of the PARU program in Thailand, moved into Laos in January and met
with Vang Po, a prominent Hmong leader. Vang Po had fought the Vietnamese
i
and the Pathet Lao for years and was anxious to obtain the new arms and
training offered by Lair. 116
The Hmong, also commonly known as the Meo, were an ancient tribe that
had practiced subsistence farming in the Laotian highlands for generations.
They roamed freely across national borders and recognized no particular national
allegiance. From the earliest days of French colonization, the Hmong had grown
opium poppies, which both the French and the resistance had used to fund
operations in the region. In the 1950s the Hmong, under Touby Lyfoung, the first
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of their tribe to graduate from a university, had sided primarily with the French.
Under Touby's leadership, in fact, the Hmong had attempted an overland relief of
the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. As French influence waned
and another turn of side taking loomed, Touby relinquished his role as the
Hmong's military leader to Vang Po, a long-term veteran of the Royal Lao Army.
Vang Po's military career had begun near the end of World War II, when
he was a messenger for the French army. He had engaged in guerrilla warfare
as a member of a partisan Hmong force assembled by Touby. Following the war
he attended the national police academy, the only Hmong to do so to that point.
The lowland Lao who filled out his class and ran the academy ostracized him.
Despite the racism, he finished at the head of his class. In 1950 he was
assigned to hunt down a communist guerrilla force that had expanded Ho Chi
Minh's war into Laos. He found and killed every man in the unit, earning him
high praise from the local French commanders, and an appointment to officer
candidate school. Like everything else he tried, he succeeded in this course and
was commissioned in the Royal Lao Army. After the 1954 Geneva agreement,
Vang Po remained in the Royal Army, rising to command a battalion composed
of his tribesmen. 117
Vang Po spent the time between 1954 and 1960 either running from Viet
Minh invasions or conducting counter-guerrilla operations along the border with
Vietnam. During these years of running and hiding, coming out to fight and
harass the enemy, Vang Po became an expert at field craft, forged his Hmong
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into a tenacious, tightly knit guerrilla force and, perhaps most importantly,
observed the destruction of Vietnamese units by French air power. These
experiences convinced Vang Po of several things. First, he wanted to command
a large conventional force. He was an expert guerrilla fighter, but he had seen
what big guns and big units could accomplish in the open, and he was hooked.
The American aid promised to provide him an opportunity to test his skills with
new and better weapons. Second, he came to believe that the communists were
ultimately bad for his people. When Kong Le staged his coup in 1960 Vang Po
agreed with the former's assessment that the leadership of the Royal Army was
corrupt and insensitive. He knew and liked Kong Le, but he disagreed with his
contemporary on the value of a neutral coalition government, believing that the
influence of the Pathet Lao was destined to subvert the new regime. Having
fought the Pathet Lao's sponsors, the Viet Minh, for most of two decades, Vang
Po decided to throw his lot and that of his people in with the Royal
Government. 118
Vang Po's alliance with the Americans was not easily arrived at. The
Hmong were not Lao nationalists any more than they were communists. In the
past they had worked as porters and guides for the Viet Minh. The Americans
earned their allegiance by convincing Vang Po that the communists were intent
on taking over Laos and divesting the Hmong of their land. Such assertions
confirmed Vang Po's own suspicions. Once arrived at, the Hmong-American
arrangement was good for both parties. American weapons and training made
Vang Po's fighters far more effective than they had ever been on the battlefield.
118 Warner, 30.
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Better performance on the battlefield meant higher morale among the Hmong
fighters, and this translated into intense loyalty to their leader, Vang Po. In turn,
such loyalty earned Vang Po greater control and prestige as a regional leader of
the Hmong. War, and the foreign aid that came with it, had brought Vang Po to
prominence and, he believed, allowed him to fight the most dangerous enemy of
his people. He therefore remained loyal to the King and his American backers.
At the same time, the loyalty and lethality of Vang Po's forces were important to
the Americans, because the Hmong lived and operated in the strategically vital
northern provinces. Vang Po's own home was just east of the Plain of Jars, and
his tribesman knew the terrain as well as anyone in the world.
The PARU teams executed the initial training of the Hmong. Using the
Thai soldiers allowed Lair to keep the American operation low profile and
alleviated potential cultural and language barriers between the trainers and their
Hmong students. The Thais were not Hmong, but they were a lot closer than the
Americans, and had the added advantage of being difficult to distinguish from the
Hmong, except up close. Under Lair's leadership, the PARU quickly set up and
conducted a series of three-day camps for 1,000 of Vang Po's Hmong. The
success of the early training brought more American CIA operatives and a vast
expansion of Operation Momentum. By May the PARU and their American
counterparts had trained nearly 5,000 Hmong, with more waiting in the wings.
The operation would eventually equip and train more than 20,000 Hmong, often
without the knowledge or approval of the Royal Lao Army leadership, or the
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American Ambassador. 119 But there was more going on in Laos that would
arguably render Momentum's early success moot.
In the early months of 1961 the PEO continued to coordinate the Special
Forces training of the Royal Lao Army under various operational names. What
had begun as Hotfoot soon became Operation White Star, with advisors
assigned to several levels of the Royal Army. (White Star advisors would also
later be used to augment Operation Momentum.) 120 On February 6th
,
General
Lemnitzer informed the President that Heintges' replacement as Chief of the
PEO, Andrew Boyle, had requested nine additional training teams.
The next day, Undersecretary of Defense Kenneth Landon offered the
President his assessment of the situation, arguing that American military aid was
misdirected. He believed that the Royal Army was being made dependent upon
American advice and equipment for survival, and could not be made self-
sufficient. The remedy, he proposed, was to direct military assistance toward the
development of forces that could "operate as guerrillas at the village level and
can live off the countryside. This is the kind of war the communists conduct in
Southeast Asia," he told the President, "and this is the kind of war we should
119
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conduct." 121 A week later Landon reiterated his point even more directly in a
memo to W.W. Rostow. He said bluntly, "The war in Laos and elsewhere in
Southeast Asia will be won or lost in the villages." 122 Again he stressed the need
to redirect American assistance toward a force that could bolster village level
support for the Royal Government.
Landon's arguments demonstrate that at least some of the people in
Washington understood the essential elements of people's war, and how to fight
it. Moreover, here is evidence that they were telling the President what they
knew. What Landon told Kennedy essentially confirmed the assessment of the
embassy in Vientiane that military assistance alone could not produce security in
Laos. Moreover, Landon had pinpointed the reason that it could not, namely that
Eisenhower's Army-centered military assistance program was misdirected and
would not produce long term results favorable to United States interests. He was
promoting a program that would do what the current PEO organization had not,
develop local support for the Royal Government, which was neither widely
representative nor popular. 123 Broadening its support among the people was the
only sure way to weaken the appeal and the power of the Pathet Lao.
Shortly thereafter, despite Landon's arguments, Kennedy approved the
deployment of nine new Special Forces teams to augment Operation White Star.
By early March the first three teams were arriving in Laos. The President also
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approved the increase of the Royal Army to a total of 32,322 men, many of whom
had already been mustered into service by Phoumi, without an okay from
Washington. 124
Kennedy's decision to expand Operation White Star at this point illustrates
a consistent trend in his decision making on Laos. When reports indicated that
things were going poorly, Kennedy reacted by increasing the level of military aid.
Even when advised to do otherwise, Kennedy consistently chose a military
option, suggesting that perhaps he misunderstood the notion of
countehnsurgency presented by the likes of Landon and Rostow. Another
possibility, and one that seems more likely, is that Kennedy's views have been
misunderstood, that his idea of flexible response focused on the military, and that
he had less confidence in the non-military aspects of CI.
From January through early March, Operation Momentum met with great
success. The Hmong were eager trainees, fierce fighters and loyal to Vang Po,
who was in turn loyal to the King. Military confrontations between the Pathet Lao
and the Hmong had been sporadic, with the smaller Hmong guerrilla forces
generally shooting and moving, rarely squaring off in a decisive engagement.
Operation White Star likewise continued apace, although assessments of the
Royal Lao Army by their American trainers were not always complementary. All
told, the early spring of 1961 showed promise, with more equipment and advisors
flowing into Laos and a tenacious new guerrilla force being developed to fight the
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Pathet Lao on their own terms. Kennedy was well on his way to demonstrating
his intention to keep Laos from falling to the communists.
In late February, he also took his first steps toward a diplomatic solution,
appealing to Burma, Malaya and Cambodia to form a neutral commission to
mediate in Laos. This proposal, originally requested by Laotian King Vatthana,
was rejected by both Cambodia and Burma, who felt it would be unproductive.
Malaya abstained from offering a decision either way. Cambodian Prince
Norodom Sihanouk applauded Kennedy's good intentions, but proposed a
fourteen-member conference to formulate a peace agreement, an idea favored
by the Soviets, Chinese, and the Pathet Lao. 125 Kennedy had little time to mull
over the disappointment he must have felt at the failure of his first effort in
personal diplomacy. Military developments in Laos were about to take a decisive
turn for the worse.
In March the weaknesses of America's military aid programs in Laos
became apparent. The Pathet Lao, strengthened by an infusion of Soviet aid,
mounted a major offensive and routed the Royal Army. On March 7th
,
W.W.
Rostow summarized the situation for Kennedy, saying, "[the] Communists
launched a probing offensive against Phoumi's men. Without much fight, our
boys fell back, apparently past the crucial crossroads. It is not yet clear whether
Phoumi's forces have the capacity to rally..."126 On March 9th the Pathet Lao
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captured the "crucial crossroads", a strategically important junction that controlled
road access between the Plain of Jars and Vientiane.
Rostow's description of the fighting is interesting on two counts. First, his
use of the words "our boys" is illustrative. The tone of his memo is clearly
disappointed. Since it is likely that American Special Forces accompanied
Phoumi's troops into combat, this choice of words could indicate that he saw their
presence as key to the Royal Army's success, or in this case, failure. Second,
the rout of the Royal Army by a "probing offensive", and the apparent concern
over whether they could rebound from it, suggests that the operation to train and
equip the Royal Army wasn't bearing much fruit, further strengthening Landon's
arguments to the President that a new approach was required.
Events continued their downward spiral through March, with the Pathet
Lao advancing and the American armed and trained Royal Army falling back. In
the face of a growing debacle, the State Department began developing a plan to
move a multi-national force from member nations of the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization into Laos. The plan called for a unilateral conventional force
deployment by the United States if SEATO failed to act. Rostow conveyed the
urgency of the situation for the President when he told him that its rapid
deterioration, and the failure of negotiations between Souvanna Phouma and
Phoumi Nosavan meant that "if Lao resistance crumbles and major centers come
under attack or fall, we may have to move very swiftly indeed..."127 Two days
later, alarmed by the communist advances, Kennedy placed Marine Corps and
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Navy units stationed at Okinawa on high alert, and sent 14 new helicopters to
Laos to augment the Air America fleet. 128
On March 27th
,
Rostow returned from a visit to the Special Forces School
at Fort Bragg with a report from three soldiers who had just returned from their
six-month deployment to Laos. His news was all bad, but helped explain the
failure of American aid to prop up the Royal Army. The three operatives told
Rostow that "Phoumi's problems have been worse than we thought... his control
over his commanders is extremely dilute... our supplies have not been moving
forward from government dumps to the field units... the communications net to
and from the field units has been feeble and has made air drops extremely
uncertain."129 This evidence, provided by advisors who had been in the field with
the Royal Army, suggests that the corruption that so incensed Kong Le was still
present and had a severely detrimental effect on the performance of the Army.
Moreover, it suggests that assessments which argued for a redirection of military
aid programs were correct.
In the midst of the March crisis, Rostow offered the President his own
opinion as to the efficacy of the administration's efforts in Laos thus far. He
believed that he had detected a dangerous tendency in U.S. policy toward the
separation of diplomacy and military action. He noted that this was the opposite
of the communist practice of carefully orchestrating the two. Separating the two,
he felt, watered down the diplomatic efforts and forced eventual military
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intervention to be larger than otherwise would have been required. Finally, he
argued that when diplomatic efforts were abandoned to the military, the eventual
political solution was abandoned along with them. Soldiers aren't politicians, he
told Kennedy, and while they may win the battle that's put in front of them, they
could not and should not develop the long-term political solutions required in
almost every case. "I think we should put our minds steadily to work..." he said,
"on how to orchestrate diplomacy and force better... In the case of Laos, we must
have a sharper notion as to what our political objective is..." 130 One might expect
Rostow's suggestion, coupled with the negative report from the field, to have
spurred Kennedy to overhaul the CI programs in Laos. What it appears to have
done, however, was drive him to deepen current commitments.
Perhaps anticipating a Republican attack on his increased involvement in
Laos, Kennedy took his case to the American people. On March 23, 1961, with
the Pathet Lao gaining ground daily on the Royal Army and increasing numbers
of American advisors being shipped to the training camps, Kennedy repeatedly
hammered the point that Laos was critical to the entire region. "Laos is far away
from America, but the world is small," he said, adding, "The security of all
Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence. Its
own safety runs with the safety of us all—in neutrality observed by us all. I want
to make it clear to the American people and to the world that all we want in Laos
130 W W. Rostow, 10 March 61, NSF, CS: Laos, JFKL.
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is peace, not war; a truly neutral government, not a cold war pawn; a settlement
concluded at the conference table, not on the battlefield." 131
Having thus publicly committed the United States to supporting a free and
neutral Laos, Kennedy continued military aid to the Royal Government and the
Hmong. He also stepped up his diplomatic efforts. On March 26th and 27th
,
he
held separate talks with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The talks succeeded in reactivating the
International Control Commission, an international monitoring group originally set
up at Geneva in 1954 to ensure a peaceful transition to neutrality. They also
managed to establish a cease-fire date of May 1 1 , although two of the three
factions fighting over Laos had yet to agree to it. 132
In April 1961 the failed invasion of Cuba splashed across world headlines,
and operations in Laos were forced into the background temporarily. Along with
word of the disaster at the Bay of Pigs came the news that the President of the
United States had decided against using American troops to ensure the success
of the operation. Kennedy, fearing such news might further damage his
credibility by making him seem indecisive, took a small but important step to
discourage any such thoughts on the part of the communists. He ordered the
PEO in Laos to have its personnel shuck their civilian attire in favor of military
uniforms, effectively transforming the PEO into an overt Military Assistance
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Advisory Group, a position it had held, covertly, since 1959. 133 Such an order
was tantamount to authorizing direct, overt ground combat.
Kennedy's order to the PEO seems, on the surface, to have been
motivated by concern over national and personal prestige. A month earlier,
however, the Chief of the PEO had complained to Joint Chiefs Chairman General
L.L. Lemnitzer, that the Pathet Lao had Vietnamese advisors down to company
level. He had asked that his Special Forces training teams be allowed to go
overt, by wearing their uniforms, and be assigned down as far as battalion
level.
134
In this case, there seems to have been a coincidence between political
and military necessity. Whatever the reasons behind the decision to go public in
Laos, it was a small but important shift in policy. One of its effects was to force a
reckoning between the United States and the Soviet Union over what was now
overt aid by the former to a country in which the latter had a stake. It also led,
almost inevitably, to the first American casualties in Laos.
In early April, the Pathet Lao launched yet another offensive against the
Royal Army in the vicinity of the Plain of Jars. One battalion of Royal forces,
advised by "Team Moon", a Special Forces advisory team led by a U.S. Army
captain of the same name, had been fighting for over a month to regain the road
junction captured by the Pathet Lao in their March offensive. On 22 April the
communist forces prepped Team Moon's positions with heavy artillery, then
launched an assault that overran the Royal Army battalion and its Special Forces
advisors. Two of the team's four members were killed during the assault. Two
133
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were captured, including Captain Moon, who was later killed by his captors after
his second escape attempt. The fourth member of the team was released after
sixteen months in captivity. 135
Having been badly routed on the Plain of Jars, Phoumi ordered his forces
into last-ditch blocking positions to protect Vientiane and Luang Prabang from the
Pathet Lao, who now held most of the critical routes to and from the heart of
Laos and seemed capable of going as far as they wished. On April 26th
,
Acting
Secretary of State Chester Bowles, reiterating the assessment of his
Ambassador to Laos, Winthrop Brown, painted a troubling picture for Kennedy.
"The military situation in Laos is becoming intolerable," he reported,
"with... Communist offensives continuing against key areas. They could result in
the capture of Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Paksane, effective bisection of the
country and control of the Mekong basin areas."136 If the Pathet Lao were
allowed to get that far, Bowles argued, they could threaten Thailand and
Vietnam. He then warned the President that Souvanna Phouma's efforts to
establish a fourteen-nation conference on Laos would turn into "a communist
victory party" if the Pathet Lao were allowed to continue their operations
unchecked. His recommendations to Kennedy included consideration of direct
and massive military intervention. 137
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Records from a series of meetings held between April 27 and April 29,
1961 make it clear that Kennedy did not wish to risk a major conventional
intervention in Laos, or the confrontation with China and the Soviet Union that
such an action might provoke. On April 27th
,
Acting Secretary Bowles reported to
Dean Rusk on the consensus of a meeting of the administration on Laos. He told
the Secretary of State that, while all present at the meeting accepted the notion
that without direct U.S. intervention all of Southeast Asia might be endangered,
the unanimous view was against introducing US forces into Laos. 138 Rusk
responded by asking what SEATO was doing in response to the crisis. The
answer to that question was, simply, not much. The members of SEATO were
split over what to do about Laos, with the majority apparently holding their breath
and hoping the cease-fire would take place as scheduled.
The recent and painful memory of the Bay of Pigs almost certainly
weighed heavily on Kennedy's mind during these tense days of debate over what
to do about Laos. There seems little doubt that his administration considered the
possibility of full-scale war with the Soviets or Chinese over Laos very real. Still,
if there was to be a superpower showdown over Southeast Asia, the documents
suggest, Kennedy preferred it to be over Thailand or Vietnam, not Laos. 139
Nevertheless, Kennedy and his advisors continued to feel strongly that the
U.S. had to prevent a communist takeover of Laos. They were in a difficult
138
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position, stuck between two distasteful choices, with apparently little allied
assistance they could count on. The situation was, perhaps, clarified a bit by
Kennedy's military advisors, who told him that "[the communists] have breached
the Annamite chain, which forms a natural barrier between Vietnam and Laos.
The next barrier is the Mekong. After the Mekong, the way is open to the entire
area..."
140 The same advisors cautioned Kennedy that the effects of non-
intervention included confirmation, for potential insurgents, that global
communism was ascendant; that the West was effectively losing the Cold War.
Such a belief, they contended, would encourage a rash of violent communist
insurgencies. Acting on such advice, but obviously uneasy about his position,
Kennedy ordered the Joint Task Force from Okinawa into position in the South
China Sea, an indication that he was prepared to at least tempt the Soviets by
rattling his saber. This may have been an effort to convince the Pathet Lao and
the Soviets of his resolve, especially in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.
The world did not get to find out if Kennedy was playing a diplomatic
bluffing game, or if he was truly prepared to risk war to keep the communists
from capturing all of Laos. On May 1 st the Pathet Lao accepted the terms of the
cease-fire hammered out by the British and the Soviets. Two days later
Phoumi's men were also ordered to stand down. 141 The confrontation over Laos
was averted, for the moment, by diplomacy. Subsequently, America suspended
military aid to Laos and the cease-fire went into effect as scheduled on May 11
th
.
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Five days later, on May 16th
,
the Second Geneva Conference was convened to
settle the three-sided dispute over the country.
On June 3rd and 4th
,
Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
in Vienna. In a contentious meeting over a range of issues from Berlin to nuclear
disarmament, the one thing the two leaders agreed on was that Laos was not
worth a superpower confrontation. They issued a joint statement following the
meeting, part of which "...reaffirmed their support of a neutral and independent
Laos... and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality and
independence..."142 With that, Kennedy's intervention in Laos entered a new
stage. He handed the reigns of American involvement in Laos to Averill
Harriman, the American delegate to the Geneva Conference. Overtly, America
was now involved only diplomatically in the Kingdom. The Momentum, PARU
and White Star teams remained in the country, however, and the secret war
continued unabated until May 1962, when the Geneva Conference ended. 143
The implication of the Pathet Lao onslaught of March and April 1961 is
that Kennedy's program in Laos had failed. The developments that led to the
second Geneva Conference, moreover, confirm several things about Kennedy's
early intervention in Laos. First, most of his programs were holdovers,
extensions, or expansions of those initiated by the Eisenhower administration.
Second, all of the programs were militarily oriented. The time, money and blood
spent training the Hmong and the Royal Army did nothing to make the Royal
Government more responsive to or representative of a significant number of its
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people. Third, the failure of the Kennedy administration to recognize these
shortcomings and institute a comprehensive CI plan, of the sort that the
President's advisors (including his own brother) were promoting, led inevitably to
the failure of military intervention. Kennedy believed in a strategy of flexible
response. His brother, Robert F. Kennedy had provided him with an Army report
that laid out the fundamentals of a holistic CI doctrine, designed for the type of
enemy he faced in Laos. Rostow, Landon and his embassy staff in Laos had all
counseled him to attack the disease, not the symptom, by addressing the basic
social and political problems of Laos, rather than fighting the Pathet Lao
exclusively. The path was there; Kennedy just failed to take it, resorting to the
old, partisan style CI of the Korea days.
With the onset of negotiations, American policy in Laos was bound to
change. While the Kennedy administration still maintained its covert aid
programs, they tried to avoid obvious violation of the cease-fire. Much of the
Hmong training conducted by the Momentum and White Star teams continued,
as did the airlift of supplies. The organization and activity of the PEO and its
operators apparently differed little from the military aid program of the pre-cease-
fire days. The Hmong and the Pathet Lao continued to skirmish in the mountains
around the Plain of Jars. In short, as the peace talks dragged out among the
three factions vying for control of Laos, Kennedy's misdirected CI program
dragged along with it. Despite a brief but intense flare-up in May 1962, during
which Kennedy deployed 3,000 Marines to Thailand in preparation for a move
94
into Laos, the Geneva Conference offered a year during which Laos was, for the
most part, out of the spotlight. 144
Geneva Changes the Rules in Laos
The outcome of the Geneva Conference promised to change the nature of
foreign intervention in Laos. The agreement announced in July 1962 called for
"the maintenance of neutrality by a regime presided over by Prince Souvanna
Phouma's neutralists, but strongly influenced by both the Pathet Lao and the
Vientiane group." 145 There was to be a coalition government, with Phouma's
neutralists holding seven seats in the national assembly, and the Pathet Lao and
Phoumi's nationalists getting four each. In this and other respects, the 1962
agreement resembled the failed 1954 agreement. The 1962 agreement, too,
called for the demobilization of most of the armed forces of all sides, and the
creation of a smaller, integrated national army. There was to be an International
Control Commission, composed of fourteen nations, which would monitor
compliance with the terms of the agreement. Most importantly for the American
aid programs, the agreement called for an end to all foreign military intervention
and the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel. The International Control
Commission would be especially interested in the latter. Article 1 of the Protocol
to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos clearly defined "foreign military
personnel" as "members of foreign military missions... advisers, experts,
instructors, consultants, technicians, observers... and foreign civilians connected
144
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with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials."146 It is
interesting that the delegates included the final passage regarding foreign
civilians. Such a broad and clear definition signaled the end of the PEO,
Operation White Star and the CIA's training of the Hmong.
The deadline for troop withdrawal was set for October 7, 1962. The
International Control Commission set up checkpoints to count foreign soldiers as
they exited the country. The checkpoints accounted for 666 American advisors
on their way out between August and September. The CIA maintained a two-
person station within the US Mission at Vientiane, ostensibly to monitor
communist compliance with the Geneva agreement. 147 With only weeks to go
before the deadline, however, the Commission reported that only 40 of an
estimated 7,000 Vietnamese advisors and soldiers had evacuated Laos. This
inaction by North Vietnam was a clear violation of the Geneva agreements and
initiated another round of discussions in Washington. Averill Harriman appealed
to Kennedy to adhere strictly to the Geneva agreement. Such discipline on the
part of the United States, he argued, might convince the neutralists that the North
Vietnamese could not be trusted, and might thereby push Phouma farther from
the communist camp. US intelligence estimates told the President (incorrectly)
that the North Vietnamese appeared interested in maintaining their access to
South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, but were not interested in
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turther encroachment into the country. Kennedy, therefore, protested the
violations but took no further action. 148 Kennedy's military advisors in Laos
slowly but surely closed up shop and left the kingdom to its uneasy neutrality.
CI Efforts in a Neutral Laos
There were non-military operations active in Laos. A non-governmental
organization called International Voluntary Services (which Warner describes as
a private forerunner to the Peace Corps) had a representative, Edgar Buell, in
the Laotian highlands as early as May 1960. His was there to teach modern
farming techniques, but just as often ended up providing intelligence to the CIA
and liaison between the other Americans and the locals, whom he had come to
know quite well. 149 With the advent of neutrality, missions such as Buell's began
to look ever more important, as the Special Group (CI) began to look for ways to
influence events in Laos without violating the Geneva agreements.
On July 3, 1962, General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
sent a memo to the other members of the Special Group (CI) detailing a proposal
for counterinsurgencies in Southeast Asia. He began the memo by offering the
opinion that the expected formation of a coalition government in Laos limited
American opportunities to exert anticommunist influence. They needed to look
more deeply for ways to influence events. "One fruitful area", he told them,
"relates to public health." He proposed to train a cadre of young Laotians from
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the "hinterlands" to provide medical aid to the chronically under-treated peasants
Furthermore, "It would develop a body of active young men who are favorably
oriented toward the United States and who, at the same time, enjoy influential
stature among their countrymen. Finally, it would provide, through the overt
relationship between the United States agencies and these young medical men,
a continuing opportunity both to infuse our ideas into the Laotian people and to
procure local information of continuing value."150 The Special Group, with the
Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defense and USIA leading the
way, set to work designing a program to engage in this and other non-combat
aspects of CI.
The medical program established by the Special Group was administered
by USAID. They recruited Doctor Charles Weldon and his wife, Doctor Patricia
McCreedy to run the operation in Laos. The husband and wife team had
developed a stellar reputation as public health doctors in American Samoa,
where they had solved the island's chronic problems with tuberculosis,
elephantiasis and high infant mortality. Once in Laos, McCreedy found herself
without a job. Weldon found himself in the grip of a crippling USAID
bureaucracy. But with the help of Edgar Buell, now the USAID's Refugee
Coordinator among the Hmong, he set about establishing an inoculation
program, basic medical training and a system of rural health clinics. What the
doctor didn't know, according to Warner, was how well his public health plan
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dovetailed with the USAID's overall development effort, and "with the CIAs re-
expanding efforts to organize the Laotians of the countryside."151
Doctor Weldon's medical program was part of a large effort, spearheaded
by the Department of States' Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. The main focus of
the program was an overhaul of American financial aid to Laos, which had been
characterized by direct budgetary support, which had proven ineffective and
allowed corruption to flourish in Vientiane. The new financial package called for
an elimination of cash grants in favor of "reimbursable financing" and expanded
imports to Laos, both of which were to be tightly controlled by U.S. and Lao
customs.
The overhauled fiscal year 1963 aid package for Laos also included the
Project Program, a $13 million initiative for rural development, teacher training
and medical assistance, including Weldon's operation. The Project Program also
included proposals for the establishment of Lao National Radio, a telephone
plant for Vientiane, and refugee resettlement and relief for the Hmong. 152
The Project Program seems finally to have incorporated the principle of
political and social reform into America's CI efforts in Laos. Improved farming,
education and public health would almost certainly produce a Laotian population
who were, as Lemnitzer hoped, "favorably oriented towards the United States." 153
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In reality, however, many of the Project Program's goals were designed to
address problems created or exacerbated among the Hmong by the earlier
military aid programs. Following the Geneva agreements and the evacuation of
American military advisors, the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao had launched major
offensives against the Hmong. The Hmong, who had fought so effectively under
the American aid program, soon found themselves running low on all manner of
supplies, including food and ammunition. Harriman had authorized a small
number of "mercy mission" supply drops to Vang Po's forces, but they were
insufficient to stave off the vastly larger communist forces. 154 In late August
1962, a communist attack on the village of Ban Ban forced some 6,000 people,
mostly Hmong, to flee south. After running for most of the day, the refugees
camped in a high valley, where the communists surprised and massacred them.
According to one account, "Children were snatched from their mothers' arms and
hurled with head-crushing force against rocks. Old men and women were shot in
the legs and left to die alone, abandoned both by their young and by their
executioners. Women were raped, then disemboweled."155 According to Jane
Hamilton-Merritt, the attack killed 1,300 refugees, again most of them Hmong.
Those that survived fled in a panic.
As word spread of the massacre, villages among the hills emptied before
the onrushing Viet Minh and Pathet Lao. Shortly thereafter, with some 20,000
refugees crowding the village of Muong Meo, Edgar Buell enlisted the aid of Air
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America (still operating in neighboring Thailand) to disperse them before they
could be cornered and attacked. Meanwhile, Doctor Weldon and his half-trained
Hmong medics tended the sick and wounded.
The communist attacks continued, with Vang Po's dwindling forces trying
desperately to defend their tribesmen, but being pushed from one mountaintop to
another. In September, after nearly 200,000 Hmong were forced to flee another
series of attacks, Souvanna Phouma requested that the US resume aid to the
Hmong, a request echoed by the CIA agents still present in Laos, and the
American ambassador. 156 This request brought a resurgence of military aid to
accompany the Program Project among the Hmong. Supply flights to Vang Po
resumed, and the CIA once again began to fight its guerrilla war in Laos, this
time from its base across the Mekong in Thailand.
In April 1963, the Pathet Lao attacked Kong Le's neutralist army, their
erstwhile ally. In May, the State Department authorized supply drops to Kong Le.
In a twist of irony that seems entirely predictable given the situation in Laos, the
U.S. was now supplying both Vang Po and Kong Le, who frequently fought each
other. Communist violations of the Geneva agreements continued, with no
reaction from the international committee designed to deal with such
infractions.
157
In November, following Ngo Dinh Diem's assassination and the
subsequent turmoil in South Vietnam, the administration's attention was once
again diverted away from Laos. Kennedy's assassination a few days later further
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diverted national and global attention. The North Vietnamese seized the
opportunity to increase the flow of soldiers and supplies into South Vietnam and
Laos, ensuring the extension of the bloody struggle in the Laotian highlands.
Conclusion
The return to military aid in the face of communist violations of the Geneva
agreements signals the failure of counterinsurgency in Laos. If one accepts the
notion that an insurgency must enjoy popular support to be successful, then the
recurrence of insurgency in Laos indicates that America's CI programs were
never successful in winning such support away from the Pathet Lao.
I contend that the failure of Kennedy's CI programs in Laos was the result
of an antiquated approach to counterinsurgency, a fundamental
misunderstanding of the type of enemy he faced and an impatience born of bad
timing and political circumstance. As I have shown, Kennedy had a workable
framework available to develop a comprehensive CI strategy. Robert F.
Kennedy had presented him with a document that described in detail the
parameters of effective counterinsurgency, and even provided suggestions as to
tactics. Rostow, Hilsman, Landon and others of his advisors had counseled him
to shift his focus from bolstering the military to building support for the Royal
Government. Moreover, Kennedy had an affinity for covert operations and
believed in flexible response. Ignorance cannot be Kennedy's defense. As I've
argued, Kennedy was shown the path; he just failed to take it.
The record shows that when faced with deteriorating events in Laos,
Kennedy's response was to repeatedly boost support for projects like White Star
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and Momentum; to train and assist more forces to fight the communists, or to
provide those forces with more weapons and supplies. When such measures
appeared insufficient, his next step was consistently to elevate the alert levels of
his conventional forces in the region, three times even moving task forces to
within striking distance of Laotian soil.
Two factors, I believe, explain his actions. First, Kennedy's record
indicates that, while he may have believed in flexible response, and may have
known about the non-military aspects of CI, the two did not necessarily coincide
in his mind. A look at Kennedy's creation of the Special Forces school
demonstrates that, while the ideal was the soldier-diplomat, the reality was the
trainer and fighter. His highest visibility project in the realm of limited war,
therefore, was not designed to provide anything more than what it did, a flexible
military response.
Second, the crisis in Laos erupted early in Kennedy's term, when he was
still trying to formulate policy and establish himself both domestically and
internationally. He had criticized Eisenhower's execution of containment, and
had to demonstrate that his theories would work better. To complicate matters
further, Kennedy had to make many critical decisions in the wake of the Bay of
Pigs disaster. The advice given by Schlesinger and Rostow, and the President's
subsequent actions, indicate that he was heavily influenced by the need to
appear decisive and committed in this period. This often meant he had to take
action that would demonstrate relatively quick results. True counterinsurgency is
a long-term proposition. While the military aspects of it, like sending new
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weapons or more advisors, might bear immediate fruit, it takes much longer to
change minds and win popular support. In his defense, Kennedy might well have
instituted a holistic CI campaign, had he not felt pressured to produce tangible
results quickly.
When Kennedy finally did introduce a relatively unified CI effort in Laos, it
was more as a response than as a prophylactic, and it was incomplete and
misdirected at that. Most of the rural development, health care and educational
programs executed by USAID after 1962 targeted the hill tribes of northern Laos,
most notably the Hmong. The same is true of the refugee resettlement
programs. The fact of the matter is that the military aid programs of 1961 created
the Hmong refugee problem, by convincing the Hmong to fight the communists,
and making them dependent on American aid to do so. When American aid
dried up, the Hmong were easy pickings for the better-armed communist forces.
Moreover, the hill tribes were already loyal to the royal government, making CI
efforts among them redundant. A higher payoff target in Laos would have been
the lowland Lao who supported the neutralists. The programs of USAID might
have borne more fruit there, by gaining more support for the royal government,
rather that bolstering existing support. To do so, however, would have required
time and patience that Kennedy apparently did not possess.
Such arguments beg the question: if Kennedy had engaged in a more
comprehensive CI program in Laos, would it have changed the outcome?
Without engaging in counter-factual history or extending the story beyond
Kennedy's assassination, I argue no. American CI doctrine in January 1961 had
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changed little since the first manual was published in 1958. The doctrine still
called for the reorganization of conventional units to fight insurgents. It was not
until the new version of the Army's overarching operational manual, FM 100-5,
Operations was published in 1962 that the roots of counterinsurgency were
addressed. The implementing doctrinal manuals, FMs 31-22, U.S. Army
Counterinsurgency Forces, 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations
Forces, and 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, were not published until 1963.
Such doctrine included the valuable lessons from Malaya, and incorporated the
views of men like Hilsman and Rostow, but arrived far too late to save Kennedy's
programs in Laos.
More importantly, the type of insurgents Kennedy faced in the Pathet Lao
were not likely to be defeated by anything short of granting Laos complete
autonomy. If one accepts the notion that the Vietnamese had designs on all of
Southeast Asia, the picture becomes even more muddled. The Pathet Lao
wanted the Americans out of Laos; the Vietnamese wanted the Pathet Lao to
secure Laos for communism. Even if Kennedy had introduced land reform, as
Magsaysay did in the Philippines, it would not have weakened the Pathet Lao,
because the populace did not rally around them for economic reasons, but rather
for as nationalists and liberators. The Pathet Lao also had the capacity to keep
fighting as long as the aid of the Viet Minh continued. Unfortunately for Laos,
that aid appears to have been limitless.
Even the non-military CI programs that Kennedy did institute in Laos failed
to address the fundamental appeal of the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao were
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fighting for independence. They had begun by resisting the French, but the
American takeover had been so complete that the Pathet Lao had naturally
transitioned to resisting the U.S. Like the French, the U.S. had few options, short
of abandoning operations in Laos altogether, that would have diminished the role
or power of the Pathet Lao. Neither the USAID, nor the CIA ever addressed the
appeal of the Pathet Lao, probably because they misinterpreted it. They appear,
at least in 1962 and 1963, to have been attempting to win the hearts and minds
of Laotians, but their efforts were misdirected. The Special Group (CI) was a
great way to synchronize the administration's CI efforts, but its documents also
indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy they were faced with in
Laos. Health clinics, schools and improved farming techniques may have kept
the support of those already sympathetic to the Royal Government, but they did
little to address the fundamental political circumstances of the country, or the
basic appeal of the Pathet Lao.
Even the best American CI efforts in Laos, then, were doomed to failure.
The non-military programs were too little, too late. They were aimed at the wrong
group of people, and in any case failed to attempt, let alone produce, any
fundamental change. They certainly were not intended to leave Laos to the
Laotians. The military efforts were no better, and from some perspectives, far
worse. Aid to the Royal Lao Army added a third faction in the Laotian political
quagmire, when Kong Le grew fed up with the corruption it bred in the Army's
General Staff. The same aid proved incapable, moreover, of making the Royal
Army a potent force on the battlefield. Aid to the Hmong was an unmitigated
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disaster. America armed, trained and supplied a tribe that grew dependent on
the aid, and was hared pressed to stave off their own destruction without it. The
fate of the Hmong demonstrates the overall weakness of Kennedy's CI efforts in
Laos: they were all temporary measures at best, destined to dry up when the
Americans who ran the operations left.
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CHAPTER 4
EPILOGUE
Laos After Kennedy
Obviously, US intervention in Laos did not end with Kennedy's
assassination in November 1963. The situation would get much bleaker in the
years to come, especially for the Hmong. By the end of 1963, the Hmong had
20,000 American trained and equipped fighters resisting the communists, but the
Pathet Lao's Vietnamese benefactors continued to add new units to the fray.
The Hmong fought as guerrillas, harassing, ambushing and launching hit and run
raids against Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and, after 1968, North Vietnamese Army
targets.
158 The communists, in contrast, fought in larger formations, with
conventional weapons and, often, conventional tactics. The contrast of styles
dragged the fight out for two more decades.
In the intervening years between 1963 and the fall of Laos to the
communists in 1975, the U.S. presence in Laos grew and changed. The CIA
station grew to 225 men, with 50 advisors among the Hmong. Lyndon Johnson
drastically increased the power and scope of the air operation, sending F-1 1
1
fighter-bombers and World War II era B-26s to the Air America base at Udorn,
Thailand. From there they ran ten to twenty sorties per day against the
combined communist forces. In 1968 the North Vietnamese sent four battalions
of their regular army to hound the Hmong, whose casualties had mounted and
who were no longer able to readily replenish their numbers. In the face of this
158
Parker, Codename Mule, xv; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 121-126.
108
development, the U.S. began to run as many as 300 bombing missions per day,
to hammer the communist formations as they maneuvered across the Plain of
Jars. But the end was near for Laos and the Hmong. Lyndon Johnson had
escalated the war in Vietnam along with the covert commitment to Laos, but
gone was any hope for a successful counterinsurgency.
One reason, obviously, was that the Hmong were effectively now the
insurgents. They had always been a guerrilla force, but now the Pathet Lao held
the majority of power and were backed by a large conventional force. Another
reason was that the American intervention had reverted to its military roots. With
the number of Hmong dwindling even as American air power in the region
increased, the US was hard pressed to find enough able-bodied young Hmong
men to field an army. They were certainly in no position to lobby for popular
support.
The war would drag on until another cease-fire was declared in January
1 973. The last American aircraft passed out of Laos on 22 February of that year,
leaving the country, and the Hmong, to the communists. 159 The horrors of war
were just beginning for the Hmong and others who had opposed the Pathet Lao.
After years of fighting and hiding in the jungles, Vang Po and his family escaped
across the Mekong into Thailand in 1976. They and a few other Hmong families
found their way to the United States, where they were settled in Montana, safely
tucked away from the genocide that was ravaging their people. Vang Po became
an American citizen.
159
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Back in Laos, the remaining Hmong were subjected to constant hounding
by the Pathet Lao. Between 1973 and 1991, they were attacked with artillery,
troops on the ground and, increasingly, from the air. Prisoners captured by the
Pathet Lao were tortured and maimed. Women were publicly raped and children
crippled as warnings to those who resisted the Pathet Lao. Perhaps most
horribly, the communists launched a chemical and biological warfare campaign to
kill those Hmong who escaped into the jungles. Reports of chemical weapons
use surfaced repeatedly between 1978 and 1991, indicating that the Pathet Lao
and their sponsors remained bent on destroying the tenacious hill tribes that had
resisted them for so long. The U.S. did not intervene. 160
Laos' Connection to Vietnam
Events in Laos during the Kennedy administration bore little on the
growing war in Vietnam. It was only after the war, with the benefit of hindsight,
that one can begin to find connections. One important line that connects Laos
and Vietnam is the development and use of CI doctrine. Laos was, I've argued,
a CI failure for Kennedy, partially because there was no doctrine for such
operations. The doctrine that appeared in 1963 was not significantly tested in
Laos. The new doctrine derived more from lessons learned from errors of
omission than it did from experience in the field. The greatest legacy in the new
doctrine traced its lineage, most likely, to the British experience in Malaya.
However it was derived, the new doctrine would be played out in Vietnam. In a
1961 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Kennedy had told the
160
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assembled officers that he "[wished] to have the maximum number of men
trained for counterguerrilla operations and put into areas of immediate
concern..."
161
Most of those men, one assumes, were military. Since the
President also instituted CI training as a requirement for promotion to general
officer, and incorporated CI doctrine into the officer training schools, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the officers who executed the war in Vietnam were
trained using Kennedy's doctrine, probably by men who's experience came in
Laos. Therein lies the connection.
Laos becomes important, therefore, because many of the same people
who had learned hard lessons in Laos simply applied them next door to Vietnam.
This is certainly true of men in the administration, like W.W. Rostow and
McGeorge Bundy, both of whom played key roles in both Laos and Vietnam. At
ground level, those who went back to the United States were often trainers for
the next generation of advisors. The CIA and Special Forces soldiers who
transited the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, as it was
soon named, must have been taught by Laos veterans. Who else would have
had the experience and still been in service? The doctrine these men taught was
very different from the operations they had executed. How well the veterans of
Momentum and White Star were able to reconcile that dichotomy is an important
question that bears directly on the success of American CI operations in
Vietnam. But how well the American passed on the hard lessons of Laos to
Memorandum for Record, "Essential Points Arising From the JCS Meeting With the
President", 23 February 1961, NSF, M&M, CS: Laos, JFKL.
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those who would attempt to win hearts and minds in Vietnam is a subject for
another inquiry.
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